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DUBIOUS PATENT REFORM 
GREGORY DOLIN, M.D.* 
Abstract: The 2011 America Invents Act sought to drastically improve the 
American patent system by creating new review processes for already issued pa-
tents. These processes were meant to reduce patent litigation costs and clear the 
field of “dubious patents,” all the while increasing certainty in the existence and 
scope of patent rights. Though this was not the first attempt to achieve these 
goals, Congress failed to heed the lessons of past reforms or fully take into ac-
count the costs associated with these new post-issuance review mechanisms. 
The result was a set of dubious reforms. This Article marshals empirical data 
and case-study based evidence to show that the newly created system is open to 
abuse, that such abuse occurs, and that the costs that Congress ignored are sub-
stantial. 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly 200 years, almost from the day it passed the very first Patent 
Act, Congress attempted to “reform” the patent system in the name of reduc-
ing the prevalence of dubious patents.1 The latest round of such reforms, en-
acted in 2011 and known as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“America 
Invents Act” or “AIA”),2 sought to address the problem of dubious patents. 
One of the bill’s authors stated that the provisions of the AIA will help get rid 
of “the worst patents, which probably never should have been issued.”3 The 
AIA was supposed to provide the Patent & Trademark Office (“Patent Office” 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, Gregory Dolin. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct Associate 
Professor of Emergency Medicine, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. B.A., Johns 
Hopkins University, M.D., Stony Brook University, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. 
This Article was supported by a Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship of the George Mason 
University School of Law. I would like to thank the participants in the Edison Fellowship program 
for their comments and support. They include Adam Mossoff, Mark Schultz, John F. Duffy, Chris 
Beauchamp, Christopher Holman, Gus Hurwitz, Ryan Holte, Camilla Hrdy, Sean O’Connor, Eric 
Claeys, Sean O’Connor, Michael Risch, Shine Tu, Kristen Osenga, and Stephen Yelderman. I also 
wish to thank Irina Manta, William Hubbard, Natalie Ram, David Jaros, Jonas Anderson, Josh 
Sarnoff, Christopher Seaman, W. Nicholson Price, Mark McKenna, David Olson, and John 
Whealan for their comments on various drafts. Finally, I must thank Robert Greene Sterne, Mat-
thew Cutler, Sandip Patel, Raymond Mercado, and Larry Lockwood for their insights on how the 
America Invents Act has affected inventors and litigants. 
 1 See infra notes 29–119 and accompanying text (exploring complaints of the patent system 
and subsequent reform efforts). 
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or “PTO”) with mechanisms for identifying low quality patents. These mech-
anisms include “post-grant review, inter partes review, supplemental exami-
nation, and derivation proceedings, as well as a transitional post-grant review 
program for certain business methods patents.”4 Unfortunately, the framers of 
the AIA fail to marshal solid empirical evidence in support of the claim that 
the system is overrun by dubious patents. In addition, they also failed to fully 
take into account all of the costs of “weeding out” the improperly granted 
patents and the fact that such costs fall disproportionally on the legitimate 
patentees. This Article will be the first to show that the costs imposed on le-
gitimate patentees by post-issuance review mechanisms may in fact be signif-
icant. To achieve this goal, this Article collects and analyzes data on the post-
issuance review processes for the first twenty-eight months of the AIA’s oper-
ation. This Article also presents several case studies that are illustrative of the 
problems and abuses that arise under the current regime. 
Through the years, many patent reforms were based on the notion that 
additional and more rigorous procedures in the Patent Office will improve the 
quality of the issued patents and thus promote the public’s confidence in is-
sued patents and patentees’ confidence in their property rights.5 On the sur-
face, the proposition seemed sound: a more detailed look on any legal claim 
makes it less likely to be incorrectly decided as a result of some question of 
fact or law being overlooked.6 As in any other legal setting, however, addi-
tional procedures generally involve an increase in costs.7 The question there-
fore is always whether the marginal increase in the benefit stemming from the 
new procedure exceeds the marginal increase in the costs associated with that 
procedure.8 Regrettably, Congress has failed to fully consider this issue when 
considering various patent reform proposals. Instead, Congress has focused 
predominantly on the benefits of the reform and either overlooked or signifi-
cantly underestimated the costs. 9 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498–99 
(2012). 
 5 See Patent Policy: Hearings on H.R. 4564 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties 
& the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982) (statement 
of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); 126 CONG. REC. 29,895 
(1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
 6 See Giles S. Rich, Foreward—and Comments on Post Issuance Reexamination, 4 APLA 
Q.J. 86, 88 (1976) (“[A patent] opposition [procedure] enables one to take advantage of the prin-
ciple that almost anything done over again a second time can be done better than it was the first 
time.”). 
 7 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admin-
istration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401 (1973). 
 8 See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2010); 
Posner, supra note 7, at 401; Bernard Schwartz, Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 28 
TULSA L.J. 793, 800–01 (1993). 
 9 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 
6463; REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at iii (1st Sess. 
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This unbalanced approach is particularly evident in Congress’ attempts 
to craft post-issuance review proceedings that would allow patent challengers 
additional and easier opportunities to invalidate an issued patent. Ever since 
the first post-issuance review proposal was made in the early twentieth centu-
ry,10 Congress and commentators extolled the virtues of additional review, for 
both the patentees and the public, without seriously questioning whether the 
proposed systems would not only provide greater confidence in some patents, 
but whether they will also cast greater (and never resolved) doubts on other 
patents.11 As a result, Congress has adopted an overly simplistic approach 
that can be described as “one set of eyes is good, two is better, three is better 
still, etc.” But as it turns out, the relationship between patent quality (however 
defined), certainty of patent rights, and the number of levels of review is not 
linear. Importantly, more opportunities to challenge issued patents also means 
more opportunities to engage in abusive practices to undermine legitimate 
patent rights.12 
A particular problem for the stability of patent rights is the presence of 
post-issuance procedures that can be used to invalidate already issued patents. 
The timing and scope of such procedures, which have been around for quite a 
long time in both the United States and around the world,13 matters a great 
deal. The easier it is to invoke such procedures, the higher the chance that 
they will be invoked abusively.14 It is one thing to allow a limited post-
issuance time period where members of the public are allowed to attempt to 
convince the Patent Office that the patent was issued in error. It is quite an-
other to have the Damocles sword of post-issuance review perpetually hang 
over the patentee’s head. It is a lesson that Congress should have learned, but 
failed to do so, from its first attempt to experiment with post-issuance review. 
The first non-judicial opportunity for post-issuance review of U.S. pa-
tents came in 1981 when Congress created the process of ex parte reexamina-
                                                                                                                           
1967); Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 487, 501 (2007). 
 10 See James H. Lightfoot, A Proposed Department of Invention and Discovery, 1 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 116, 127 (1919) (providing the earliest proposal for a post-issuance review mechanism). 
 11 See infra notes 120–186 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of the pre-
America Invents Act reforms). 
 12 See Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 613 (1985) (“The poten-
tial for misuse of procedure exists at all times and in all procedural models.”). See generally Timo-
thy G. Pepper, Comment, Beyond Inherent Powers: A Constitutional Basis for In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litigation, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1777 (1998) (observing that an increase in pretrial 
procedures has led to delay and abuses). 
 13 For a description of various opposition procedures around the world that long preceded the 
adoption of such procedures in the United States, see various essays published in 4 APLA Q.J. 93 
(1976). 
 14 See Resnik, supra note 12, at 613. See generally Pepper, supra note 12. 
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tion.15 That procedure allowed any member of the public, at any time during 
the life of the patent, to request that the Patent Office take a “second look” at 
an issued patent. A “second look” involved reconsidering whether the patent 
does in fact satisfy the conditions of novelty and non-obviousness.16 The re-
sult of this experiment was that the procedure was often employed multiple 
times against the same patent, leaving the patentees (and the public) perpetu-
ally uncertain of the scope and even the very existence of the patent rights.17 
Nor did the ex parte reexamination succeed in “weeding out” many patents. 
In fact, the vast majority of patents emerged from the process with their 
claims either fully confirmed or just moderately amended.18 
The Congress enacted the America Invents Act against this backdrop. 
Yet, instead of taking into account all of the drawbacks of the ex parte reex-
amination process and the reasons for the existence of such drawbacks, Con-
gress doubled down. Instead of reforming the old process, Congress created 
three additional mechanisms for post-issuance review while keeping the ex 
parte reexamination process intact.19 As before, these new procedures were 
advocated as significant improvements over the then-existing system.20 They 
were intended to reduce litigation costs, increase certainty in patent rights, 
and “weed out” “low quality” patents.21 The discussion of the potential op-
portunities to abuse these new procedures (especially in conjunction with the 
retained ex parte reexamination), however, got short shrift. As a result, 
whereas prior to 2012 patent challengers had just one, however powerful, tool 
to harass patentees, now they have four. And each of these tools has been 
consistently used for that exact purpose. 
None of this means that there is no value in post-issuance review proce-
dures or that they have been used only, or even primarily, for nefarious ends. 
Nor will this Article contest that there are improperly issued patents or that 
the public would not benefit from invalidating such patents. Rather, this Arti-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 
3015, 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
 16 35 U.S.C. § 301. 
 17 See generally Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and Abuse of Patent Reexamination: Sham 
Petitioning Before the USPTO, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93 (2011) (discussing abuses in 
the patent reexamination process). 
 18 See Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) Is Changing Patent 
Protection and Litigation, ASPATORE (Jan. 2013), 2013 WL 571334, at *5. 
 19 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.); infra notes 187–292 and accompanying text. 
 20 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–40 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 68–
70; William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 346 (2013). 
 21 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–40; Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of 
Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVA-
TION (2012)). 
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cle’s claim is much narrower. The claim here is that by focusing dispropor-
tionally on the costs imposed on the public by the owners of dubious patents 
and by seeking to alleviate that problem, Congress failed to fully appreciate 
the costs of its cure.22 This Article will show that these costs are indeed sig-
nificant and that oftentimes the effect of the AIA is diametrically contrary to 
what was promised and intended by its drafters. With this information availa-
ble, hopefully Congress and commentators will consider these issues when 
drafting any additional patent reform measures. 
The Article proceeds in several parts. Part I discusses the history and the 
arguments that led to the creation of post-issuance review proceedings in the 
United States.23 Part II focuses on the operations of the first post-issuance 
review process created—the ex parte reexamination—and the problems asso-
ciated with that process.24 Part III then mirrors the preceding part in its struc-
ture, but instead focuses on the AIA-created post-issuance procedures.25 Part 
IV presents data from the first twenty-eight months of the AIA’s operations.26 
Relying on these data, this Part will show that the problems endemic to the ex 
parte reexamination persist under the new regime.27 Finally, Part V presents 
several case studies and provides specific examples of abuses that the current 
post-issuance review system tolerates, if not welcomes.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 For another example of a similar error, see Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent 
Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1709 (2013) (discussing the failure to measure idealized theory 
against the empirical reality that pervades much of patent law scholarship). 
 23 See infra notes 29–119 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 120–186 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 187–292 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 293–357 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 293–357 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 358–449 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE ROAD TO POST GRANT REVIEW PROCEDURES 
 Post-grant review procedures were not created in a vacuum. Instead, 
they were the product of years of incremental patent reform and extensive 
political debate. Section A discusses the recurrent complaint of “low quality” 
patents.29 Section B explains the arguments for patent reexamination 
procedures.30 Finally, Section C examines the criticism that ex parte 
reexaminations favor patentees.31 
A. The Recurrent Complaint of “Low Quality” Patents 
Reviewing the current criticism of the patent system and the Patent Of-
fice, one could easily conclude that the system has deviated from the right-
eous path. The culprits of such deviation appear to be the overly patentee-
friendly Patent Office, the Federal Circuit, and the ability to patent things that 
previously were thought to be unpatentable (e.g., business methods).32 The 
picture that emerges then is a corrupted system that is prone to “low quality” 
patents, which are a burden on innovation and the economy.33 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 57–93 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text. 
 32 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54, reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 84 (noting 
that “[a] number of patent observers believe the issuance of poor business method patents during 
the late 1990’s through the early 2000’s led to the patent ‘troll’ lawsuits”); Megan M. La Belle & 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business Method Patents, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431, 
449–50 (2014) (noting the drastic rise in the number of business method patents issued by the 
PTO); Susan J. Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter 
Sands: Does Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem?, 
34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 239 (2011) (arguing that “the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) often approves claims consisting of little more than a rudimentary 
flow chart”); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 215–17 (2009) (arguing that courts 
have abandoned the gatekeeping function on patentable subject matter causing significant ineffi-
ciencies); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316 (noting “the dramatic expansion of patentable 
subject matter and the diminution of the utility requirement”). 
 33 See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32996, 
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES 6–7 (2005), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/
RL32996.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4DCM-UFB6 (arguing that low patent quality has nega-
tive effects on innovation and economy); 153 CONG. REC. E775 (statement of Rep. Berman) (“Lit-
igation abuses, especially ones committed by those which thrive on low quality patents, impede 
the promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts.”); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PA-
TENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-
PAYING JOBS 5 (2010), available at http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7K6S-8CRF; Kevin R. Davidson, 
Note, Retooling Patents: Current Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Economic Implications for 
Patent Reform, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 425, 442 (2008) (“[E]xcessive numbers of low-quality 
patents can prevent healthy rates of innovation.”). 
2015] Dubious Patent Reform 887 
argument goes, the system is in dire need of reform to restore the previously 
existing balance.34 
In reality, however, the criticism of the Patent Office and the concern 
about “low quality” patents is as old as the Patent Office itself. Complaints 
that improperly issued patents (those of dubious quality and validity) retard 
growth and innovation and concomitant calls for reform of the system have 
been the mainstay of patent law debate for two centuries. For example, in 
1809, the Superintendent of Patents wrote that “many of the patents are use-
less, except to give work to the lawyers, & others so useless in construction as 
to be . . . merely intended for sale.”35 A few years later, he went so far as to 
declare that a patent issued under his own authority was a fraud on the pub-
lic.36 
At about the same time, a federal judge, in a reported case, opined that: 
The very great and very alarming facility with which patents are 
procured is producing evils of great magnitude. It encourages the 
flagitious peculations of imposters, and the arrogant pretensions of 
vain and fraudulent projectors. . . . Amidst this strife and collision, 
the community suffers under the most diversified extortions. Exac-
tions and frauds, in all the forms which rapacity can suggest, are 
daily imposed and practiced under the pretence of some legal sanc-
tion. The most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in com-
mon use are denominated improvements, and made pretexts for in-
creasing their prices, while all complaint and remonstrance are ef-
fectually resisted by an exhibition of the great seal.37 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.
nber.org/chapters/c5303.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C2MY-7YQV (“While there is no doubt 
that the U.S. economy remains highly innovative, and there is no doubt that the patent system 
taken as a whole plays an important role in spurring innovation, the general consensus is that the 
U.S. patent system is out of balance and can be substantially improved.”); Bruce A. Kaser, Patent 
Application Recycling: How Continuations Impact Patent Quality & What the USPTO Is Doing 
About It, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 426, 426 (2006) (arguing that a “complex set of 
factors . . . have converged to create a perfect storm that is driving the patent system out of bal-
ance and giving rise to the need for patent reform”); Letter from the Coalition for Patent Fairness 
to Sens. Harry Reid & Mitch McConnell (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/
files/CPF%20January%20Letter%20vF.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/492S-LSBB (arguing that 
the patent reform “will stimulate American innovation, growth and competitiveness by restoring 
balance to our patent system”). 
 35 Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 888 (1998) (quoting Letter from William Thornton, Superinten-
dent, U.S. Pat. Office, to Amos Eaton (May 5, 1809)). 
 36 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—An Early Patent Controversy, 79 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 533, 533 (1997). 
 37 Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1826). 
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The Senate Report that accompanied the 1836 Act concluded that “[a] con-
siderable portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void,” and that 
patent litigation was “daily increasing in an alarming degree, [and is] onerous 
to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society.”38 
Predictably, these complaints of “useless” patents and “onerous” litiga-
tion were accompanied by calls for reform.39 Eventually, Congress heeded the 
reformers’ calls and passed the Patent Act of 1836, which moved the United 
States from a patent registration to a patent examination system.40 
The change in the patent granting system, however, did not eliminate the 
prevailing complaints about the abundance of “useless [patents].”41 This is 
not surprising, given that the number of patent applications and issued patents 
dramatically increased following passage of the Patent Act of 1836.42 In fact, 
“[t]he number of patents issued per year grew at unprecedented—and, to this 
day, unmatched—rates in the mid-nineteenth century.”43 This rise in number 
of granted patents brought with it the rise of outrage at the number of granted 
patents.44 The complaints of the 1870s were almost identical to those of the 
1820s. Testifying before a special joint House and Senate Committee on Pa-
tents, one commentator opined: 
[T]hat there is a large class of patents extant that do not cover prac-
tical machines, but contain principles upon which other more prac-
tical inventors have builded, [sic] and which are infringed by the 
other patented devices, and are good for nothing except to be 
bought and speculated upon by those who are justly called patent 
sharks—those practically useless patents come into value only at a 
very late stage in their history, after the line of inventions has pro-
ceeded to a practical result.45 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Sen. John Ruggles, S. REP. Accompanying Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 28, 
1836), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_for_Bill_No_293.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HX7S-33GK. 
 39 See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Real-
ism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1126–29 (2000) (highlighting 
general dissatisfaction with the pre-1836 patent system and calls for reform). 
 40 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870). 
 41 See Thompson, 23 F. Cas., at 1041; Walterscheid, supra note 35, at 888. 
 42 John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2119 & 
n.35 (2007) (collecting data regarding the increasing rate of patent application and issuance). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innova-
tion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007) (discussing how a patent litigation “tactic out-
raged rural activists and led to the same calls for sweeping patent reform that we hear now”). 
 45 ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS, H.R. MIS. DOC. 50, at 123 (2d Sess. 1878) 
(additional argument of J.H. Raymond). 
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Patents were often attacked for being nothing more than tools to extract 
rents from unsuspecting farmers, and patentees were often referred to as “pa-
tent sharks” rather than inventors of useful technological improvements.46 
Prominent newspapers referred to the Patent Office as a “shaving shop, a 
flunkey’s office, where evidence is prepared and manufactured regardless of 
truth, for the benefit of a few monopolists who want their patents extended 
from time to time.”47 
In 1870, Congress again significantly reformed the patent laws by re-
quiring the patent applicant to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or dis-
covery.”48 Changes to the laws also limited the practice of applying for reis-
sue patents that were broader than the original grant.49 Again, this reform was 
meant to improve the quality of the patents by circumscribing the patentee’s 
ability to enforce overly vague patents against the unsuspecting public.50 
Congress continued to periodically tinker with the Patent Office procedures, 
but did not undertake another major revision of the patent laws until 1952.51 
The 1952 Patent Act was also preceded by much debate about the fail-
ures in the patent system,52 and was enacted in part to “improve patent quali-
ty” and curb excessive litigation.53 Yet, even this drastic overhaul of the pa-
tent laws met only grudging acceptance in the judiciary.54 Judges continued to 
have “a fundamental lack of trust in the competency of the PTO to discover 
sources of relevant prior art and apply them properly under the statutory 
standards,” and the courts continued to invalidate patents at a fairly high 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387, 390 (2014); Magilocca, supra note 44, at 1829, 1833. 
 47 Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Ma-
chine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 198 (2011) (quoting Sewing Machine-Patent Ex-
tension—an Irate Opponent, 23 SCI. AM. 41, 41 (1870)). 
 48 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed in 1952). 
 49 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming 
the Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 403 (2005). 
 50 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The [1870 Act] seeks 
to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from 
uncertainty as to their rights.”); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 51, 67 n.67 (2010) (“The public, it was thought, could now have more confidence on 
where the patentee’s proprietary boundaries resided . . . .”); Joseph S. Cianfrani, Note, An Economic 
Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (1997) (“The peripheral system of 
patents seeks to increase the reliability on the claims by the public by limiting the bounds of the pa-
tent to that covered by the claims and a narrow range of equivalents.”). 
 51 See Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrines 
of Means-Plus-Function Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 229 (1997). 
 52 Id. at 272. 
 53 See Christopher L. Logan, Comment, Patent Reform 2005: H.R. 2795 and the Road to 
Post-Grant Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 975, 978–79 (2006). 
 54 Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (1997). 
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rate.55 This, in turn, led to further attempts to strengthen and improve the pa-
tent system, and these attempts are continuing to this day.56 
B. The Arguments for Patent Reexamination Procedures 
In 1981, after again voicing concern for the proliferation of “doubtful 
patents” and costly litigation, both of which supposedly resulted in a drag on 
innovation and economic development, Congress set out to create an adminis-
trative process that would address these problems.57 This new administrative 
process was supposed to allow the PTO to correct its errors by withdrawing 
the improperly issued patents while greatly reducing the cost of litigation.58 
The proceedings would eventually take the form of a second (albeit some-
what more limited) round of patent examination.59 
This idea was by no means new. The idea of reexamination was pro-
posed more than sixty years prior to its enactment.60 What is striking though 
is that the arguments for reexamination proceedings in 1918 were almost 
identical to the arguments used for the next sixty years and eventually in the 
1980s. The author of the 1918 proposal argued that the then-existing patent 
system resulted in patents being granted for things “not invented,” “not new,” 
and “not useful,” all causing “unsettled, unsafe and unsound business condi-
tions.”61 Similarly, a 1936 Science Advisory Board concluded that the patent 
system was suffering from significant defects such as “issuance by the Patent 
Office of an enormous number of patents, many of which should never be 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 9–10. With the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in 
scattered Sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)), the rate of patent invalidation was significantly reduced. 
See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives 
on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (noting significantly reduced rate of patent 
invalidation after the creation of the Federal Circuit); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 936 & n.35 (2000) (same). 
 56 See Janis, supra note 54, at 8–15 (discussing policymakers’ reform proposals from the 
beginning of the twentieth century on); see also infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 57 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 771 
F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985); H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 3 (2001) (“The 1980 reexamination statute 
was enacted with the intent of achieving three principal benefits. It is noted that the reexamination 
of patents by the PTO would: (i) settle validity disputes more quickly and less expensively than 
litigation; (ii) allow courts to refer patent validity questions to an agency with expertise in both the 
patent law and technology; and (iii) reinforce investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights 
by affording an opportunity to review patents of doubtful validity.”); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, 
at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463 (noting the bill “strengthens investor 
confidence in the certainty of patent rights by creating a system of administrative reexamination of 
doubtful patents”); 126 CONG. REC. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
 58 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604; H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 3. 
 59 See Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 
3015, 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
 60 See Lightfoot, supra note 10, at 127. 
 61 Id. at 118–19. 
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issued” and “excessive cost and delay in the litigation of patents.”62 A 1943 
Report of the National Patent Planning Commission also argued “that a patent 
may be and frequently is granted which would have been refused if the Patent 
Office had been in possession of additional facts,” and that such invalid pa-
tents are “used by the owner as an instrument in restraint of trade or to force 
tribute from unwilling licensees.”63 
The 1952 Patent Act reform did nothing to abate the calls for new ad-
ministrative proceedings that would withdraw improperly issued patents and 
reduce the high cost of litigation.64 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson ap-
pointed a special Presidential Commission on the Patent System.65 The next 
year, the Presidential Commission issued a report titled “To Promote the Pro-
gress of Useful Arts.”66 In its report, the Presidential Commission raised the 
same concern highlighted by the 1943 National Patent Planning Commis-
sion—that “patent owner[s] can continue to assert [clearly invalid] claim[s] 
because no one is willing or able to expend the resources necessary to obtain 
a court decision” invalidating the claims.67 To remedy the situation, the Presi-
dential Commission proposed administrative reexamination proceedings upon 
the payment of a “relatively high fee.”68 The Presidential Commission con-
cluded that such a system would result in greater confidence in patents and 
reduce costs of litigation.69 
The Presidential Commission’s report resulted in renewed Congression-
al attempts to administratively fix the problem of “low quality” patents. The 
first round of reform legislation was introduced in 1967, with several compet-
ing bills being advanced in the House and Senate.70 These bills justified simi-
lar proposals along the same lines.71 Although none of the proposals became 
law, similar bills with similar justifications, were introduced in almost every 
subsequent Congress.72 Judges and academics also protested that there was a 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Science Advisory Board, Report of the Committee on the Relation of the Patent System to 
the Stimulation of New Industries, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94, 96 (1936). 
 63 REP. OF THE NAT’L PATENT PLANNING COMM., 78th Cong. (1943), reprinted in 25 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 455, 460 (1943). 
 64 REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., supra note 9, at iii (concluding 
that there, “has not been an adequate adjustment of our patent laws and procedures . . . to respond 
to the critical problems confronting the Patent Office”). 
 65 Exec. Order No. 11,215, 30 Fed. Reg. 4661 (Apr. 8, 1965). 
 66 See generally REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., supra note 9. 
 67 Id. at 37. 
 68 Id. at 30. 
 69 Id. at 24. 
 70 H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 2597, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 1691, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 
1042, 90th Cong. (1967). S. 1042 was the primary bill and as a result was reprinted in full in 49 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 152 (1967). 
 71 113 CONG. REC. 30,370 (1967) (statement of Sen. Dirksen). 
 72 See, e.g., H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1013, 113th 
Cong. (2013); H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 14632, 94th Cong. (1976); S. 473, 94th Cong. 
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broken patent system. For example, former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas 
wrote that “[m]ost judges, rightly or wrongly, are inclined to think that a 
strong, well-financed applicant has a pretty good chance of getting at least 
some patent claims allowed somewhere along the line, and they don’t have 
much confidence in the process or respect for the result.”73 One academic 
commentator wrote that one can get “a patent on almost anything” if you “sit 
around the Patent Office long enough.”74 
In light of such criticism, Congress continued to attempt to reform the 
patent laws. The 93rd Congress was especially noteworthy for its flurry of 
activity in this area.75 At least four separate bills were introduced in Congress, 
each of which contained some sort of reexamination proposal.76 As in all pre-
vious iterations of the debate, the sponsors of the proposals argued that the 
changes would lead to the “improvement of the quality and reliability of 
United States patents.”77 For the first time, a bill to add reexamination pro-
ceedings to the PTO practice passed the Senate, though it eventually died in 
the House, in part because of objections to other reform proposals embedded 
in the bill.78 These repeated Congressional failures only intensified the scorn 
heaped upon the Patent Office and the patent system as a whole. Michigan 
Senator Philip A. Hart condemned the existing patent system in the harshest 
terms, writing: 
[T]he present patent system in the United States cannot be de-
scribed as a success, for the evidence is strong that our system 
tends to frustrate invention, raise costs to consumers, and tie up 
technology so the public cannot benefit from it. Undoubtedly, it al-
so has contributed in recent years to the lessening of our traditional 
international technological leadership. . . . The Office stresses 
quantity—rather than quality—of issued patents. . . . “[It] is often 
obliged to reach its decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the 
aid of the arguments which could be advanced by parties interested 
in proving patent invalidity.”79 
                                                                                                                           
(1975); S. 4259, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2930, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2504, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 
1321, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 643, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 12880, 91st Cong. (1969); S. 1569, 91st 
Cong. (1969); S. 1246, 91st Cong. (1969). 
 73 Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 810, 816 (1971). 
 74 MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 189 (1968). 
 75 See S. 4259; S. 2930; S. 2504; S. 1321. 
 76 See S. 4259; S. 2930; S. 2504; S. 1321. 
 77 Hugh Scott & Dennis Unkovic, Patent Law Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an Ex-
tended Gestation, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 956 (1975). 
 78 See S. 2255, 94th Cong. (1976); see also 122 CONG. REC. 4530 (1976) (reporting passage 
of S. 2255). 
 79 Philip A. Hart, Patent Reform—An Overview, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 579, 579–60 (quoting 
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)). 
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The Senator also lambasted his colleagues for failing to do something 
about what he perceived to be a sorry state of affairs at the PTO, noting that 
despite the “[m]any hours of testimony and scores of filed statements . . . 
[t]he reasonably strong and innovative bills of 1967, which implemented the 
1966 recommendations, were systematically watered down until, as finally 
reintroduced in 1971, the legislation was devoid of meaningful reform and 
contained substantially lower standards of invention.”80 
Despite this volley of criticism, it would take another four years and two 
Congresses for the reexamination proposal to become law.81 That finally hap-
pened in 1980 as part of the Bayh-Dole Act.82 The justifications advanced by 
the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act were the same as before. Thus, the Com-
mittee Report accompanying the bill confidently stated that it “strengthens 
investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights by creating a system of 
administrative reexamination of doubtful patents.”83 The Report predicted 
that: 
Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about 
the validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and 
lengthy infringement litigation. This, in turn, will promote industri-
al innovation by assuring the kind of certainty about patent validity 
which is a necessary ingredient of sound investment decisions. . . . 
A new patent reexamination procedure is needed to permit the 
owner of a patent to have the validity of his patent tested in the Pa-
tent Office where the most expert opinions exist and at a much re-
duced cost. Patent office reexamination will greatly reduce, if not 
end, the threat of legal costs being used to ‘blackmail’ such holders 
into allowing patent infringements or being forced to license their 
patents for nominal fees.84 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 581–82. 
 81 In the meantime, the Commissioner of the PTO created a quasi-reexamination proceeding 
which allowed a patentee to request a reissue application “during which issues of patentability 
over previously uncited prior art, as well as over public use or on sale allegations and issues of 
fraud, could be raised and resolved before the Office.” Kenneth R. Adamo, Reexamination—to 
What Avail? An Overview, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 616, 625 (1981). This procedure was available 
only to the patentee himself and could not be utilized by members of the public or potential in-
fringers, and was enacted (unsurprisingly) “to improve the quality and reliability of issued pa-
tents.” Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,729 (Oct. 4, 1976). 
 82 Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, 94 Stat. 3015 
(1980). 
 83 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307 pt. 1, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463. 
 84 Id. at 3–4, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6463. 
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The architects of the bill, Representative Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin 
and Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana echoed the Committee Report’s conclu-
sions.85 
Although this Article will discuss the mechanics of the reexamination 
process in greater detail in the subsequent Section, at present it is worth point-
ing out that the reexamination proposal enacted in 1980 significantly differed 
from the proposals for reexamination that were advanced in previous Con-
gresses and advocated by earlier commentators. The early conceptions of the 
reexamination process foresaw a procedure that would take place soon after 
the initial grant of the patent. Thus the initial 1918 proposal for a reexamina-
tion process contemplated merely a “second look” before the patent issued.86 
The 1943 report of the National Patent Planning Commission went a bit fur-
ther. Its proposal included public participation (rather than just a pre-issuance 
“second look”), but limited the period for such contests to six months follow-
ing the issuance of the patent.87 The 1966 Presidential Commission hewed to 
the same parameters of a limited oppositional period.88 The initial reformers 
sought to create a system where the cost to the inventor stemming from the 
new proceedings would be minimal. The 1966 Presidential Committee’s re-
port assured the readers that: 
Little delay in the issuance of patents would result from this proce-
dure. The applicability of the newly cited art would be determined 
immediately after the expiration of the six month period following 
the publication which gives notice of allowance or of the filing of 
an appeal. Moreover, the applicant need not suffer from such delay 
since, under certain circumstances, damages could be recovered for 
infringement during the period following publication.89 
Similarly, Judge Giles S. Rich, one of the key authors of the Patent Act 
of 1952 and a preeminent authority on patent law wrote: “Oppositions shortly 
after patent rights come into being (between five months and one year in the 
British ‘belated opposition’) are favored.”90 One commentator cautioned 
against patent reexaminations unrestricted by time, but endorsed a proposal 
                                                                                                                           
 85 126 CONG. REC. 30,364 (1980) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 126 CONG. REC. 29,895 (1980) 
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
 86 See Lightfoot, supra note 10, at 127. 
 87 REP. OF THE NAT’L PATENT PLANNING COMM., supra note 63, at 460–61. 
 88 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 89 Id. at 31–32. 
 90 See Rich, supra note 6, at 87–88 (emphasis added). 
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that would have allowed public opposition and reexamination proceedings 
within a year of a patent’s allowance.91 
Nonetheless, and despite these concerns, the 1980 Act contained no time 
limit on challenging issued patents in administrative proceedings.92 There is 
not much in the legislative history explaining the evolution from the limited 
period for reexamination to the period that would last the entire life of the 
patent beyond the usual recitations that the availability of administrative pro-
ceedings will greatly reduce the cost of litigation.93 No particular considera-
tion appears to have been given to the warnings that will become evident in 
the later Parts of this Article. 
C. The Criticism of Ex Parte Reexamination as Favoring Patentees 
Irrespective of how one counts, it took Congress several decades to cre-
ate a reexamination process. Yet, almost as soon as it was created, calls for 
reform began. Just a year after President Carter signed the Bayh-Dole Act 
into law, critiques of the new practice arose.94 Specifically, it was argued that 
“reexamination will come up short, and actually fail to perform its intended 
function of ‘improv[ing] the reliability of reexamined patents.’”95 In addition, 
critics lamented that “[t]he essential nature of the reexamination process be-
ing strictly ex parte robs it of any capability of providing binding finality to a 
judgment of validity, though such finality will attach if the reexamined claims 
are found to be unpatentable.”96 
These criticisms proved prophetic in at least one regard—the reexamina-
tion process ended up being perceived as underutilized.97 When the Bayh-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Edward F. McKie, Jr., Proposals for an American Patent Opposition System in the Light of 
the History of Foreign Systems, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94, 101 (1974) (arguing that a proper “op-
position” system would limit such “oppositions” to “within one year after issuance of the patent”). 
 92 See Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 
3015, 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)) (“Any person at any time may file a re-
quest for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 93 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 94 See generally Adamo, supra note 81 (criticizing the reexamination process). 
 95 Id. at 617. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See 145 CONG. REC. 20,727 (1999) (“Congress enacted legislation to authorize ex parte 
reexamination of patents in the PTO in 1980, but such reexamination has been used infrequently 
since a third party who requests reexamination cannot participate at all after initiating the proceed-
ings.”); Dale L. Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Patent Reform at the Crossroads: Experience in 
the Far East with Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the United States, 7 N.C. J.L. 
& TECH. 261, 268 (2006) (“[T]he lack of requester involvement and the inability of the requester 
to appeal either a denial of a reexamination request or an adverse decision if reexamination is 
granted has resulted in ex parte reexamination being an underutilized method for challenging 
patent validity.”); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. 
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition—and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
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Dole Act passed, the accompanying House Report estimated that several 
thousand patents would be reexamined each year.98 In reality, only a few 
hundred were.99 For decades, third-party concerns of the reexamination pro-
cess persisted.100 
Congressional review also concluded that the dearth of reexaminations 
was attributable to the fact that “a third party who requested reexamination 
was unable to participate in the examination stage of the reexamination after 
initiating the reexamination proceeding.”101 In 1990, then-Secretary of Com-
merce Robert Mosbacher created an Advisory Commission on Patent Reform 
that produced a comprehensive report recommending a number of changes in 
the patent system.102 One recommendation was “providing third parties with 
more opportunities for substantive participation during the reexamination 
proceeding.”103 In the Advisory Commission’s view, such a change would 
“build confidence in the reexamination process so that third parties will be 
inclined to raise patent challenges in this forum rather than through litiga-
tion.”104 
Once again arguing that the changes in the reexamination procedures 
would improve patent quality,105 Congress enacted an alternative inter partes 
                                                                                                                           
L.J. 63, 66 (1998) (“[T]he reexamination system implemented under this legislation has been 
underutilized and has not fulfilled its promise. In general, third parties have been unable to mount 
meaningful validity challenges under the reexamination system.”). 
 98 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 25 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6484. 
 99 See Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the Patent Reexamination Statute to Elimi-
nate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 887, 887 n.1 (1994) (noting that under 400 
reexaminations per year had been ordered in the first decade of the procedure’s availability). 
 100 LAWRENCE A. STAHL & DONALD H. HECKENBERG, JR., THE CHANGING ATTITUDES TO-
WARD INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 1 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.fitzpatrickcella.
com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/attachment622.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J9E8-25JV. 
 101 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINA-
TION 2 (2004), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HX7S-33GK. 
 102 See generally THE ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF COMMERCE (Aug. 1992), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/
patentact/ACPLR-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S29S-9BBS. 
 103 Id. at 14; see also id. at 117–23 (discussing the reexamination process and proposing 
changes to that process). 
 104 Id. at 14. 
 105 See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76756 (Dec. 7, 2000) (“The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 included an amendment to 
the Patent Act to authorize the extension of reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes 
(multiparty) reexamination procedure . . . as a means for improving the quality of United States 
patents.”); Roger Shang, Inter Partes Reexamination and Improving Patent Quality, 7 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 185, 185 (2009) (“The inter partes reexamination procedure was created 
by Congress in 1999 as a means to challenge dubious patents and to improve patent quality.”); 
Logan, supra note 53, at 988–89 (noting that inter partes reexamination was enacted in response to 
the failure of ex parte counterpart to improve patent quality). 
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reexamination in 1999.106 The two reexamination mechanisms existed side by 
side.107 This is where things remained until the passage of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act of 2011, at which point the inter partes reexamination 
was abolished and replaced with inter partes review.108 
This history indicates that for nearly a century the advocates of post-
issuance administrative review mechanisms proceeded under the conviction 
that the Patent Office consistently issues “low quality” patents that impede 
rather than promote innovation. At no point, however, was any definition of 
what constitutes a “low quality” versus a “high quality” patent, and how to 
tell the two apart, offered.109 Instead, the reformers simply cited the high rate 
of patent invalidation during judicial proceedings.110 Admittedly, the rate of 
patent invalidation could be an indication of the poor screening mechanism at 
the PTO and the “low quality” of the patents issued.111 But, it could also be 
the result of the low quality of judging by those who do not understand the 
technology or who are generally hostile to exclusive rights secured by the 
patents.112 There was never solid empirical evidence to support the notion 
                                                                                                                           
 106 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified 
in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed 2012). 
 107 Shang, supra note 105, at 188 (“Inter partes reexamination is ‘optional’ because a third 
party can request either ex parte or inter partes reexamination for patents filed on or after Novem-
ber 29, 1999.”). 
 108 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299–305 
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012)); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 595, 633 (2012). 
 109 See DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 22–24 (2012), available at http://www.european
chamber.com.cn/en/publications-patent-policy-innovation-in-china-study, archived at http://perma.
cc/9QH6-7RLF (noting a lack of consensus on “what exactly a definition of ‘patent quality’ 
should entail”). 
 110 See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the In-
ternet, & Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Rep. 
Howard Berman) (“A poor quality patent, on the other hand, is typically invalid and may have far-
reaching and negative ramifications for the individuals involved, as well as for the economy at 
large.”); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 
84-2, at 4 (2nd Sess. 1956) (noting that between fifty and sixty percent of litigated patents were 
invalidated); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding a forty-six percent rate of invalidity for litigated 
patents); Janis, supra note 54, at 8–15 (arguing that many patent reform efforts were a “Response 
to Judicial Hostility to the Presumption of Validity”).  
 111 In other words, if the PTO overlooked some important issue or invalidating prior art, that 
would make the patent “low quality,” and also would make it vulnerable to invalidation in litiga-
tion. But the reverse is not necessarily true, i.e., simply because a patent has been invalidated in 
litigation does not ipso facto mean that the PTO failed in its quality control. 
 112 Cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Af-
fect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 919 (2001) (concluding that the identity of a presiding 
judge has significant effect on the rate of invalidation, which ranged in her study from 14% in the 
Southern District of Florida to 56% in the District of Massachusetts). I am not suggesting that 
Massachusetts judges are better or worse at judging patent cases than Florida judges. Instead, 
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that it is the former rather than the latter problem that is the cause of the high 
rate of patent invalidation.113  
Even when the rate of patent invalidation dramatically decreased, the 
complaints of “low quality” patents persisted.114 In other words, for nearly a 
century, reformers have been offering a cure for a disease that may or may not 
exist.115 To be sure, at all times there have been plenty of anecdotes of the 
Patent Office issuing frivolous patents. But evidence of the existence of silly 
patents is not evidence of “low quality” patents constituting a drag on the 
economy. Although it may be best if patents for a “Method of Swinging on a 
Swing”116 not issue in the first place, such a patent, if never litigated, li-
censed, or otherwise asserted, is simply not an impediment to any economic 
development.117 
Furthermore, the reformers consistently extolled the benefits of their 
cures while barely pausing to acknowledge the cost of their proposals. To the 
                                                                                                                           
Professor Moore’s study indicates that the rate of patent invalidation may depend as much on the 
intrinsic quality of a patent as it does on the venue in which it is being litigated. For that reason, 
equating quality with a rate of invalidation is inappropriate. See id. at 919. 
 113 It is true that someone must be the final judge, and of necessity, the legal “correctness” of 
any decision must be measured against the conclusions of that final judge. Still, the mere fact that 
a “final judge” concluded that someone else made an error, does not necessarily prove that, as an 
objective (rather than purely legal) matter, an error was made. 
 114 According to Professor Glynn Lunney, the rate of patent invalidation steadily decreased 
since 1975. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 
371 (2001). Yet, as discussed in this Part, Congress created ex parte and inter partes reexamina-
tions after 1975, justifying these new procedures on the grounds that the Patent Office is con-
cerned more with quantity rather than with quality of patents. See Hart, supra note 79, at 579–60. 
 115 See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012) 
(marshalling data to show that patents owned by so called “patent trolls,” which are often derided 
as being “low quality” and supposedly used mostly to extract rents from practicing entities, are in 
actuality invalidated at no higher rate than any other patents). 
 116 Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (issued 
Apr. 9, 2002). 
 117 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 79–83 
(2005) (indicating that only 1.5% of patents are ever asserted and arguing that, therefore, improp-
erly granted patents are not a serious problem); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001) (estimating that no more than five percent of all 
patents are either litigated or licensed); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differen-
tial Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 8 (2007) (noting that “patents such as the Tarzan Swing 
Method, the Beerbrella, a Method for Exercising Your Cat (with a laser pointer), the Hair Comb-
Over Patent, and the Peanut Butter & Jelly Sandwich . . . are silly, but they are typically of little 
consequence”); cf. Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog . . . A 
Story of Prolonged Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending Pirates, 92 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 208, 267 (2010) (arguing that even lowering the quality of PTO issued 
patents is not likely to have a significant effect on economic development because “[t]he vast 
majority of patents are never used, never commercialized, never asserted, and never challenged”). 
But see generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Pa-
tents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006) (arguing that mere ownership of invalid patents negatively 
affects competition). 
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extent that such costs were even acknowledged, they were regarded as mini-
mal.118 As it turned out these costs are not at all insignificant and fall dispro-
portionally on the patentees.119 To understand why, one must understand how 
the post-issuance review mechanisms work and what they do and do not ac-
complish. 
II. THE WORKINGS AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PRE-AMERICA INVENTS  
ACT REEXAMINATION PROCESSES 
Prior to the passage of the AIA reforms, Congress created the ex parte 
reexamination process to provide an alternative to patent litigation. Section A 
addresses the mechanics of this process.120 Then, Section B explores the pit-
falls and shortcomings of ex parte reexamination.121 
A. The Reexamination Process 
The reexamination proceedings created in 1981 and 1999 were meant to 
resolve any new doubts that might have arisen about the patent’s novelty in 
light of previously unconsidered prior art, while simultaneously strengthening 
the patent system and the reliability of issued patents.122 In other words, the 
reexamination is limited only to issues covered by sections 102 (novelty) and 
103 (obviousness) of the 1952 Patent Act.123 Other issues bearing on the pa-
tent validity could not be addressed in these proceedings.124 
Anyone (including the patentee)125 can request reexamination by sub-
mitting prior art to the Patent Office and arguing that, in light of the submis-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., supra note 9, at 31–32. 
 119 See infra notes 297–355 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 122–144 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 145–186 and accompanying text. 
 122 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601–02 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing the benefits of the reexamination). 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (“Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior 
art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person believes to have a bearing on the 
patentability of any claim of a particular patent.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.552 (2014); MPEP § 2258 (9th 
ed. Mar. 2014); see also Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 326–27 (2011) (“Currently, reexaminations may be conducted only 
when certain prior art can be shown to invalidate the patent. In other words, reexamination covers 
only § 102 (anticipation) and § 103 (obviousness) rejections.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, Contracting for 
a Return to the USPTO: Inter Partes Reexaminations as the Exclusive Outlet for Licensee Chal-
lenges to Patent Validity, 51 IDEA 309, 326 (2011). The America Invents Act changed the lan-
guage of the statute somewhat (specifically to allow challengers to request reexaminations on the 
basis of “statements of the patent owner filed in a proceeding before a Federal court or the Office 
in which the patent owner took a position on the scope of any claim of a particular patent,” 35 
U.S.C. § 301(a)), but reexamination remains limited to the issues of novelty and obviousness. 
 124 See Dolin, supra note 123, at 326–27; Karshtedt, supra note 123, at 326. 
 125 For obvious reasons patentees cannot request an inter partes reexamination of their patents 
as there would be no third party to participate. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (“Any third-party requester 
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sion, the patent fails to clear either the novelty bar of section 102 or the obvi-
ousness bar of section 103 (or both).126 It is worth noting that the request for 
reexamination cannot be “precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publi-
cation was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Of-
fice.”127 Rather, “the appropriate test to determine whether a [reexamination 
is warranted] should not merely look at the number of references or whether 
they were previously considered or cited but their combination in the appro-
priate context of a new light as it bears on the question of the validity of the 
patent.”128 This means that the PTO can end up considering and ruling on the 
same prior art several times over.129 
Once a request for reexamination with all of the supporting documents is 
received, the PTO considers the petition and grants it if, and only if, the peti-
tion raises a “substantial new question of patentability.”130 This preliminary 
inquiry was meant to “prevent[] potential harassment of patentees by” serving 
as a significant barrier to non-meritorious requests for reexaminations.131 In 
practice, however, the inquiry proved to be little more than a pro forma re-
                                                                                                                           
at any time may file a request for inter partes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the basis 
of any prior art . . . .”). On the other hand, since the creation of the ex parte reexamination, almost 
a third of all requests were filed by patent owners. See U.S. PATENT. & TRADEMARK OFF., EX 
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—SEPT. 30, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/stats/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KE9D-
YXLW?type=pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING 
DATA]. 
 126 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–302. 
 127 Id. § 303(a). 
 128 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 3 
(2001)). 
 129 See J. Steven Baughman, Reexamining Reexaminations: A Fresh Look at the Ex Parte and 
Inter Partes Mechanisms for Reviewing Issued Patents, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
349, 350 (2007) (“In 2002, Congress amended the reexamination statute to reverse the prior rule 
and make clear that even the same art previously cited to and considered by the USPTO can give 
rise to a substantial new question of patentability.”); Mercado, supra note 17, at 124. 
 130 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
 131 H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 2 (2001) (“As part of the original 1980 reexamination statute, 
Congress struck a balance between curing allegedly defective patents and preventing the harass-
ment of patentees. It adopted a standard requiring a request for reexamination to raise a ‘substan-
tial new question of patentability.’”); see also Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamina-
tion Reform: Is It Time for Corrective Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 235–36 (2003); Janis, supra note 54, at 45–46. 
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quirement.132 In fact, the PTO has granted and continues to grant in excess of 
ninety percent of all requests for reexamination.133 
If an ex parte reexamination request is granted, the petitioner is no long-
er involved in the actual process (unless, of course, the petitioner is also the 
patentee).134 In other words, once the petition for reexamination is granted, 
the process unfolds just like the original examination of a patent application 
would, with only the applicant and the PTO involved.135 This means that dur-
ing the reexamination, the PTO applies the same rules as it does in the initial 
examination.136 All claims are given their broadest possible construction137 
(meaning that they are more likely to read on prior art, and therefore are more 
likely to be held invalid),138 and no presumption of validity attaches to any 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Paul R. Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform: 
Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Courts?, 20 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1143 (2010) (“[T]he current trigger, a sub-
stantial new question of patentability, is deemed met by the Patent Office in 95% of the applica-
tions. So it’s almost no standard at all. Anybody who wants to get a reexam can get it, except for 
5% of the time.”). 
 133 See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1 (reporting a 92% grant 
rate of reexamination requests. Indeed the denial rate for third party requests alone is even lower, 
clocking in at just over 6%, or 606 out of 8874 petitions); see also Raymond A. Mercado, Ensur-
ing the Integrity of Administrative Challenges to Patents: Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COL-
UM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558, 574 (2013). 
 134 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2014) (“The active participation of the ex parte reexamination re-
quester ends with the [grant of the petition for reexamination], and no further submissions on 
behalf of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered.”). 
 135 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (“[R]eexamination will be conducted according to the procedures 
established for initial examination . . . .”); MPEP § 2254 (9th ed. Mar. 2014) (same). On the other 
hand, if an inter partes reexamination were requested and granted, the petitioners could continue 
participating in the reexamination process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318. Interestingly, and contrary to 
the Congressional, professional, and academic expectations, this alternative did not prove to be 
particularly popular because of the significantly higher fees for the initiation and the high costs of 
participation in the proceedings. See Kenneth L. Cage & Lawrence T. Cullen, An Overview of 
Inter Partes Reexamination Procedures, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 931, 939 n.41 
(2003) (noting that, in 2001, the fee to request an inter partes proceeding was $8800 and the fee 
for an ex parte proceeding was $2520) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1)–(2) (2003)). Compare U. S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—JUNE 30, 2012, at 
1, available at http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/IP_quarterly_report_June_
30_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9VFC-HVVS (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (reporting only 
1695 requests for inter partes reexamination since the program began), with EX PARTE REEXAMI-
NATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1 (reporting 7135 ex parte requests in the same time 
period, calculated by adding ex parte requests starting in 1999—the year inter partes reexamina-
tion became available). 
 136 35 U.S.C. § 305; MPEP § 2254; see also Dolin, supra note 123, at 319 (“T]he reexamina-
tion departs from the same starting point as the original examination . . . .”). 
 137 MPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Mar. 2014) (“During patent examination, the pending claims must 
be ‘given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.’”). Recall that 
reexamination, once started, proceeds in the same manner as the original examination. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 305. 
 138 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2004) (“[A] ‘broader’ claim 
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claim.139 During the reexamination proceedings the patentee can amend his 
claims to narrow140 (but not broaden)141 their scope, much like he would be 
able to do during the initial examination.142 In essence, it would be fair to say 
that for the purposes of evaluating the continuing patentability of claims sub-
ject to reexamination, the issued patent is treated as a mere patent applica-
tion.143 As is the case with the examination of a patent application, the patent-
ee can appeal any adverse decision by the examiner to the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) (formerly Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences), and then to the federal courts.144 
B. The Pitfalls and Shortcomings of the Reexamination System 
The reexamination process did not live up to its expectations on almost 
any metric. The question is: why? This Section discusses the failings that are 
inherent in the statute and the process of reexamination. The focus here will 
be on the statutory shortcomings, while a subsequent Part will focus on how 
these shortcomings affect actual inventors and patentees. 
In discussing the shortcomings of the reexamination system it is useful 
to recall the purpose for which it was created—to provide a more affordable, 
faster, and expert alternative to litigation.145 After all, one of the major argu-
                                                                                                                           
interpretation . . . increases the chance that the claim will be found invalid.”); Bruce M. Wexler, 
Patent Law: Bridling the Doctrine of Equivalents—Preclusion by Prior Art, 1991 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 571, 604 (1992) (“[T]oo broad a construction could render the claims invalid over prior 
art.”). 
 139 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 855–56 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); Dolin, supra note 123, at 
319. 
 140 Janis, supra note 54, at 67 (“[T]he patentee is allowed to propose narrowing amendments 
or narrowed new claims . . . .”); Douglas Duff, Comment, The Reexamination Power of Patent 
Infringers and the Forgotten Inventor, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 710 (2013) (“[R]eexamination 
affords the patent owner a chance to narrow the scope of the claims to avoid being invalidated 
based on subsequently discovered prior art.”). 
 141 35 U.S.C. § 305 (“No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim of 
the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding under this chapter.”); Janis, supra note 
54, at 66–67 (“A patentee cannot propose claim- broadening amendments, or broader new claims, 
in reexamination.”). 
 142 See Michael J. Mauriel, Note, Patent Reexamination’s Problem: The Power to Amend, 46 
DUKE L.J. 135, 140 (1996) (“The patent applicant often begins with broad claim language, and 
narrows her claim language in response to the feedback provided by the PTO in its initial rejection 
of the claim.”). 
 143 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“In a reexamination pro-
ceeding . . . the ‘focus’ of the reexamination ‘returns essentially to that present in an initial exami-
nation.’” (quoting In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 857)). 
 144 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b), 141(b). On September 16, 2012, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences was renamed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board as a result of the America Invents 
Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 6. 
 145 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307 pt. 1, at 3–4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 
6463 (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the validity of issued 
patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation.”) (emphasis added); 
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ments in favor of creating the reexamination process was the significant cost 
of litigation—a cost that would be avoided by resorting to the supposedly 
more affordable, faster, and more expert administrative proceedings.146 
 But, the ex parte reexamination proceedings failed to become a substi-
tute for litigation for several reasons. First, in the reexamination proceedings 
the PTO can focus only on two bases of invalidity—lack of novelty under 
section 102 and obviousness under section 103.147 The PTO is powerless to 
consider any other potential basis for finding the patent invalid (e.g., failure 
of enablement or written description under section 112, patent ineligibility 
under section 101, or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent).148 Thus, 
even if the PTO were to reconfirm the patent in the reexamination proceed-
ings (or if it failed to even initiate such proceedings for lack of a substantial 
new question of patentability under section 102 or section 103) that does not 
prevent the putative infringer from re-arguing the issue or arguing any other 
grounds of invalidity in court.149 In other words, instead of becoming an al-
ternative avenue to resolving issues of patent validity, the reexamination pro-
cess simply bifurcates the dispute for resolution in two different fora.150 
The bifurcation, however, is not the only hurdle on the way to substitut-
ing reexamination for litigation. Under the statute, the reexamination process 
has no preclusive effect on litigation,151 nor does litigation have any preclu-
                                                                                                                           
145 CONG. REC. E1790 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble); 126 CONG. REC. 
30,364 (1980) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 126 CONG. REC. 29,901 (1980) (statement of Rep. 
Harold Hollenbeck). 
 146 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 147 See supra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
 148 Dolin, supra note 123, at 326–27; Karshtedt, supra note 123, at 326 (“[R]eexamination 
challenges cannot be based on grounds such as incorrect inventorship, inequitable conduct, un-
patentable subject matter, or lack of utility—indeed, any ground that does not involve citing ‘pa-
tents or printed publications’ against the issued patent.”). 
 149 See N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for 
Change Based Upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945, 954 
(1994) (“Unless the patent is invalidated or ‘substantively’ altered, there is absolutely no binding 
legal effect as a result of the reexamination. Therefore, even though a patent has been reexamined 
and a certificate of reexamination has issued, the courts are free to subsequently invalidate the 
patent on the basis of the same prior art that was analyzed during the reexamination.”). 
 150 See Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 767 
(2008) (“Congress has not so far created a significant role for the PTO in the infringement litiga-
tion process, either with respect to issues of claim construction, validity, or enforceability, though 
the reexamination process is perhaps becoming increasingly significant as an adjunct to litiga-
tion.”); Mauriel, supra note 142, at 136 (“In practice, however, parties are requesting reexamina-
tion in addition to—not instead of—bringing patent validity issues to district courts.”); Charles E. 
Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, How the Senate Patent Reform Bill Would Abridge the Right of 
Judicial Review in Patent Reexaminations—And Why It Matters, 3 LANDSLIDE 21, 23 (2010) 
(“[T]he use of reexamination has become a recognized administrative adjunct to patent litigation 
. . . .”);  
 151 Bauz, supra note 149, at 954; Steven M. Auvil, Note, Staying Patent Validity Litigation 
Pending Reexamination: When Should Courts Endeavor to Do So?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 
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sive effect on reexamination,152 or rather, neither procedure has a preclusive 
effect on the patent challenger.153 The patentee, on the other hand gets to lose 
only once, for once a patent claim is invalidated, that claim is invalid forev-
er.154 In other words, a patent that has emerged from reexamination unscathed 
can still be invalidated in litigation. The reverse is equally true.155 
Because the courts and the PTO must operate under different standards 
in evaluating the claims’ compliance with the requirements of sections 102 
and 103,156 the courts in litigation cannot be guided by the PTO determina-
tions in reexamination even on matters of novelty and obviousness.157 To 
make matters more problematic, the PTO itself is not constrained by its own 
prior determinations of validity.158 Of course, the very nature of reexamina-
tion process is meant to allow the PTO the opportunity to have another “bite 
at the apple,” and correct any mistakes that may have crept into the original 
patent examination.159 But that is not the only thing the statute allows. Rather, 
                                                                                                                           
327 (1993) (“Patent claims that survive reexamination intact remain, nonetheless, subject to the 
same validity attacks during litigation as those asserted during reexamination. The Patent Office 
determination, thus, does not have a preclusive effect against third parties, such as the third-party 
requester, whose petition for reexamination was unsuccessful.”). 
 152 See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that prior judg-
ment by Article III court upholding validity of a claim is not a bar to reexamination); In re Swan-
son, 540 F.3d at 1378–79 (same). 
 153 See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text. 
 154 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–50 (1971) 
(holding that a party whose patent has once been held invalid is estopped from asserting it against 
others); see also Janis, supra note 54, at 81. 
 155 In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d at 1364 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“[T]he 
PTO in reexamination proceedings and the court system in patent infringement actions take differ-
ent approaches in determining validity and on the same evidence could quite correctly come to 
different conclusions. In particular, a challenger that attacks the validity of patent claims in civil 
litigation has a statutory burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Should the 
challenger fail to meet that burden, the court will not find the patent valid, only that the patent 
challenger did not carry the burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before the 
court. In contrast, in PTO reexaminations the standard of proof—a preponderance of the evi-
dence—is substantially lower than in a civil case and there is no presumption of validity in reex-
amination proceedings.”). 
 156 See Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: Strategic Applications of Reexamination Versus an Ag-
gressive Adversary (Part I), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 471, 483 (2002) (“Courts have 
held that litigation and reexamination are two separate proceedings and thus will lead to different 
outcomes.”). 
 157 See id. 
 158 See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (“The existence of a substantial new question of patentabil-
ity is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was previously cited by or to the 
Office or considered by the Office.”). 
 159 See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604 (“The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors 
made by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if need be to 
remove patents that should never have been granted.”); Amy J. Tindell, Final Adjudication of 
Patent Validity in PTO Reexamination and Article III Courts: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, 89 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 787, 791 (2007) (“Congress intended to enable the government 
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the statute allows unlimited bites at the apple, with the PTO empowered to 
reexamine the patent multiple times with each subsequent decision to proceed 
to reexamination and the conduct of reexamination itself not bound by the 
result of previous reexamination processes.160 As already mentioned, even the 
fact that the cited prior art has already been considered by the PTO and found 
to be not invalidating is not a bar to either ordering reexamination or cancel-
ling the claims at issue.161 The limited nature of the reexamination process, 
together with any lack of preclusive effect of the examination necessarily 
prevents the reexamination process from being an alternative to litigation.162 
Nor is the structure of the proceedings conducive to accomplishing 
Congress’ other goal—reducing costs. To the contrary, the system increases 
costs to all the participants, but especially to the patentees.163 How did the 
solution, decades in the making, end up having the exact opposite effect of 
what was promised? The answer follows almost directly from the preceding 
discussion. Because reexamination, even when used, cannot and does not 
substitute for litigation, it means that both reexamination costs and litigation 
costs are incurred.164 Instead of paying for a single process (either litigation 
or reexamination), the litigants end up paying for both of them.165 Unlike liti-
                                                                                                                           
through its patent administrative agency to correct mistakes made in issuing questionable pa-
tents.”). 
 160 See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
 161 It is important to note that this is not a result of the law of unintended consequences. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite. When the Federal Circuit held that in light of the statute as originally 
drafted “a patent holder would not have to argue that claims were valid over the same references 
that had been considered by the PTO during the original examination,” In re Portola Packaging, 
Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 790–91 (Fed. Cir. 1997), Congress amended the statute to explicitly overrule 
this holding. See Pub. L. No. 107–273, § 13105, 116 Stat. 1758, 1900 (2002). Under the amended 
statute, reexamination “is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was previ-
ously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 303(a); see In re NTP, 
Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing Congressional overruling of In re Portola). 
 162 See Osenga, supra note 131, at 230–36; Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questiona-
ble Business Method Patents Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 
2408 (2006). 
 163 Jason P. Cooper & Zachary A. Higbee, How the Proposed Patent Fee Schedule Diminish-
es the Benefits of the AIA, and a Possible Solution, 59 FED. LAW.16, 16 (2012) (“When an alleged 
infringer was being sued, the reexamination process offered a quick way to increase the transac-
tion cost for the patentee . . . .”); Mercado, supra note 133, at 562–63 and 598–99; Stefan Blum, 
Note, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 395, 420 (2012) 
(“[T]he ex parte reexamination experiment failed to serve the intended purpose of reducing litiga-
tion costs . . . .”). 
 164 See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying rehearing en 
banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[R]eexamination after a patent has been sustained in court is a 
multiplier of cost, delay, and uncertainty . . . .”). 
 165 Id.; Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, 
Not a Supplement, 19 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 177, 205–07 (2009) (discussing how reexamination is 
used as an adjunct to litigation ultimately resulting in yet more litigation, and increasing, rather 
than decreasing costs). 
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gation, however, the distribution of costs is entirely unequal.166 Whereas in 
litigation both parties bear roughly the same costs for attorney’s fees, expert 
reports, depositions, and the like,167 reexamination costs are much more one-
sided. Recall that ex parte reexaminations are conducted without participation 
by the third party requester.168 That means that the cost to the requester of the 
examination is the fee for the request plus the cost of a prior art search and an 
opinion letter stating why the claims are invalid in view of the discovered 
prior art.169 The cost to the patentee on the other hand is much more signifi-
cant.170 Not only must the patentee respond to the initial filing, he must spend 
resources to essentially re-prosecute the claims in the Patent Office.171 Fur-
thermore, because successfully defending the patent in reexamination is not a 
bar for another reexamination request by the same or a different requester, the 
costs to the patentee can rapidly snowball.  
                                                                                                                           
 166 Bauz, supra note 149, at 955–56 (noting that in ex parte reexamination “typical monetary 
cost to a third party will be much lower than that to the patent owner”). 
 167 See R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (reporting litigation 
cost data on a “per side” basis); Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 764 (2009) (“A patentee may pay for high cost 
litigation with nothing to show for it—no finding of infringement or remedies because the patent 
is adjudged unenforceable.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced 
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 117 (2006) (noting that “win or lose, the alleged infringer 
may end up paying millions in litigation costs”). The indirect costs (opportunity loss, “making 
marketing, research and development, and other business planning difficult while the outcome of 
the case remains uncertain.” Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settle-
ments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698, 703, 704 (2004)). As a result, they may be weighed against the 
patentee, but at least direct costs are roughly equal in litigation. 
 168 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 169 See Nellie A. Fisher, The Licensee’s Choice: Mechanics of Successfully Challenging a 
Patent under License, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 46 (1997) (observing that reexamination 
“[c]osts typically include attorney fees for preparation of the reexamination request and possibly a 
reply, and government fees for the reexamination itself”); Alan W. Kowalchyk & Joshua P. Gra-
ham, Patent Reexamination: An Effective Litigation Alternative?, 3 LANDSLIDE 47, 49 (2010) 
(“Ex parte reexamination is comparatively inexpensive compared to litigation. This is due largely 
to the limited role of a third-party requester after the reexamination is granted.”); Gino Cheng, 
Comment, Doubling Up the Horses in Midstream: Enhancing U.S. Patent Dispute Resolution by 
the PTO’s Adoption of the JPO’s Hantei Request System, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 375, 382 n.29 (2008) (noting that only inter partes reexamination, but not ex parte 
reexamination comes with “hefty attorney fees”). 
 170 Bauz, supra note 149, at 955–56; Mercado, supra note 17, at 133–34. 
 171 See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012). Additionally, the appeals process in patent reexamination is 
designed in a way that imposes additional costs on the patentees. See Robert Greene Sterne et al., 
Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court Litigation or Section 337 USITC Investi-
gations, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 8 (2010) (“[T]he patent owner is forced to appeal the rejection of 
a single claim even though all of the other claims in reexamination are confirmed or allowed. This 
all or nothing aspect of the reexamination process can force appeals and is unlike original prosecu-
tion where allowed claims can be issued in a patent and rejected claims can continue to be prose-
cuted in a pending application.”). 
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Some attorneys have advised their clients to withhold some prior art ref-
erences during the initial reexamination request so as to enable a subsequent 
request should the first proceeding be resolved in the favor of the patentee.172 
The marginal cost to the challenger for such piecemeal submissions is fairly 
minimal (beyond another reexamination request fee), but the cost to the pa-
tentee is roughly the same for each individual reexamination proceeding.173 It 
is little wonder then that patent challengers use reexamination as an adjunct 
rather than alternative mechanism to attack patents.174 With an opportunity 
for multiple bites at the apple and the ability to impose a disproportionate cost 
on the patentee while carrying a fairly light burden themselves, the reexami-
nation process presents a potent weapon for patent challengers.175 
The reexamination process also failed to achieve Congress’ goal of 
speedy dispute resolution. The average length of a reexamination proceeding 
is about twenty-five months,176 which is roughly comparable to the pendency 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 45 (“If the reexamination request was an ex parte request, 
such [withheld] art could become the basis for subsequent reexamination requests, if necessary 
and non-cumulative.”); S. REP. 111-18, at 56 (2009) (quoting the strategy to litigating patent va-
lidity of a San Fernando-based law firm known as the “Patent Assassins” as “using one set of prior 
art in the reexam, and saving a second set of prior art for use in litigation”). 
 173 In other words, the challenger would pay for a single search, and then decide which art to 
present to the PTO while holding other art in reserve. Should the challenger choose to file a sub-
sequent reexamination request, the cost for the search and expert declarations would have already 
been incurred, and the only additional cost that the challenger would have to bear would be the fee 
for requesting a new reexamination. On the other hand, should the reexamination be granted, the 
patentee would essentially be returned to square one, having to re-prosecute his claims all over 
again. See 35 U.S.C. § 305. This process can play out multiple times. See Sterne et al., supra note 
171, at 14–15 (“[M]ultiple PTO proceedings involving the same patent are not rare. In fact, multi-
ple reexaminations of the same patent or a reexamination with a parallel reissue application are 
seen frequently, especially if the patent is perceived as being very valuable or is part of a hard 
fought litigation. Since 2000, only 2,560 unique patents have been involved in 5,680 reexamina-
tion proceedings . . . . [P]ractitioners file multiple ex parte reexaminations (alone or in combina-
tion with an inter partes reexamination) on the same patent.”); Kevin B. Laurence & Matthew C. 
Phillips, Multiple Reexamination Requests, INTEL. PROP. TODAY, Aug. 2010, at 8 (“It is not un-
common for the same patent to be the subject of multiple reexaminations, or at least multiple reexam-
ination requests.”), available at http://www.stoel.com/files/IPToday_August2010.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L8X9-V8SM. 
 174 See Randall R. Rader, Addressing The Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent Cases 
Pilot Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2013). 
 175 See James L. Wamsley, A View of Proposed Amendments to Patent Reexamination 
Through the Eyes of a Litigator, 36 IDEA 589, 589 (1996) (noting that reexamination “has be-
come a tactical weapon frequently deployed by defendants in patent infringement actions”); Ben 
M. Davidson, Reexamining Reexaminations: Reexaminations May Become a More Powerful Tool 
in Patent Litigation in Light of the New Patent Law, L.A. LAWYER, Dec. 2011, at 26 (“Reexami-
nation can be a powerful weapon in the hands of those who seek to invalidate a patent.”). 
 176 See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1 (reporting average 
pendency of a reexamination at 27.8 months and median pendency at 20.1 months); U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., REEXAMINATIONS FY 2014, at 2, available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/patents/stats/Reexamination_operational_statistic_F_14_Q3.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/SA35-H8LQ?type=pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter REEXAMINATIONS FY 2014] 
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of a case in the trial court.177 That, however, is only half the story. Because 
reexamination proceedings are often not a substitute but an adjunct to litiga-
tion, the time it takes to resolve the patent dispute is often increased rather 
than decreased.178 This is especially likely when judges choose to stay litiga-
tion proceedings pending the outcome of the reexamination.179 As the PTO 
can neither resolve all of the potential invalidity (much less infringement) 
issues,180 nor even bind the courts on the issues that it does resolve, the time 
spent in reexamination is often in addition to that spent in litigation. 
Finally, the reexamination process also failed to achieve the paramount 
goal of increased certainty in the strength and quality of issued patents (as-
suming that the “quality” of a patent can be measured and defined). A patent-
ee who prevails in either litigation or reexamination cannot be certain that 
further reexaminations will not be requested or ordered, possibly by the same 
third party whose prior submissions failed to invalidate the patents.181 To be 
sure, it is possible that juries may be more sympathetic to patents that have 
been reconfirmed in the reexamination proceedings,182 and that this solicitude 
                                                                                                                           
(reporting average time from filing a reexamination request to the Notice of Intent to Issue a 
Reexamination Certificate was 25.22 months based on data from the first quarter of 2014); U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., STATISTICAL DATA CENTRAL REEXAMINATION UNIT (CRU), EX 
PARTE (EP) AND INTER PARTES (IP) PROCEEDINGS FISCAL YEARS 2012–2013, at 11, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/crudatareport.pptx, archived at https://perma.cc/4Y9T-
J2YR?type=pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter CRU DATA FY 2012–13] (reporting that 
in 2012–2013 the average length of an ex parte reexamination was twenty months, but was signif-
icantly longer if the matter was appealed to the PTAB, and longer still if further appeals were filed 
with the Federal Circuit). 
 177 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2011 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: PATENT LITIGATION 
TRENDS AS THE “AMERICA INVENTS ACT” BECOMES LAW 27–28, available at http://www.aipla.
org/resources2/intlip/Documents/Other-International-Events/US-Bar-JPO-Liaison-Council-2012/
2011-patent-litigation-study.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V2H8-GDV6 (reporting average time to 
trial as 2.28 years (or 27.36 months)). 
 178 Cooper & Higbee, supra note 163, at 16 (“Prior to the passage of the America Invents Act 
(AIA), ex parte and inter partes re-examination were often used as a tool to prolong or complicate 
litigation.”); Ammon Lesher & Tom Vanderbloemen, Patent Reform 101: What Every South Car-
olina Lawyer Should Know, 24 S.C. LAW. 28, 32 (2012) (“[L]itigants often used reexaminations in 
tandem with a pending court case, further driving up costs and delays.”); Etan S. Chatlynne, Note, 
The Burden of Establishing Patent Invalidity: Maintaining a Heightened Evidentiary Standard 
Despite Increasing “Verbal Variances,” 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 297, 314 (2009) (The current sys-
tem “prolongs an invalidity challenge by encouraging reexamination in addition to litigation in-
stead of encouraging it as an alternative to litigation”). 
 179 Mercado, supra note 133, at 574 (“It is well known that judges are strongly inclined to 
stay patent infringement cases when a reexamination proceeding is pending . . . [with] [s]ome 
district courts . . . granting motions to stay up to 85% and 65% of the time.”). 
 180 See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. 
 181 See supra notes 158–162 and 172–175 and accompanying text. 
 182 See Shannon M. Casey, The Patent Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of 
Third Party Participation, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 559, 562 (1995) (“[A] patent which emerges from 
reexamination unscathed has an enhanced validity to a jury beyond what is presumed by law, 
putting third parties at a disadvantage.”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validi-
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may make patentees more certain of their rights.183 The same, however, can-
not be said of the PTO. Once a reexamination is ordered, the claims will un-
dergo examination on the same general basis as a patent application.184 In that 
sense, all prior PTO conclusions are not entitled to and do not receive any 
deference.185 
In short, the major drawbacks of the ex parte reexamination system are 
(a) lack of a meaningful threshold to initiate the process; (b) lack of estoppel 
provisions either in civil suits or in further proceedings before the PTO; (c) 
lack of certainty; (d) disproportionate costs on the patentees; and (e) an ex-
cessively lengthy process. The combination of these factors gives the patent 
challengers the opportunity to continuously cast doubt on legitimate patent 
claims and to “blackmail” patent holders into lower royalty rates. It is these 
problems that the AIA supposedly addressed.186 
III. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT REFORMS 
The America Invents Act was nearly a decade in the making and was 
preceded by a constant drumbeat in academic journals, judicial opinions, and 
congressional speeches decrying the proliferation of “low quality” patents 
that harm innovation and impose significant costs on consumers.187 The AIA 
                                                                                                                           
ty, Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 
1024–25 (2008) (“[O]nce a patent issues from an ex parte or inter partes reexamination, the factual 
inference from the grant to its validity may be significantly stronger than from the initial grant.”). 
 183 See Benjamin J. Bradford & Sandra J. Durkin, A Proposal for Mandatory Patent Reexam-
inations, 52 IDEA 135, 160 (2012) (“Upon issuance from the reexamination, the patentee would 
be confident about the validity of the patent and could enforce his or her rights under the patent.”); 
Justin J. Lesko, A Proposal for Early Interactive Third Party Participation at the USPTO, 21 
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 257, 266 (2011) (“More rigorous scrutiny at the 
USPTO through third party submissions and arguments will give patentees better assurance that 
issued patents will hold up in court, even if examination is initially more difficult.”). 
 184 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 185 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 186 See, e.g., 57 CONG. REC. S5428 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(arguing that the post-issuance review proceedings under the AIA provide more protections to 
patentees against frivolous requests and harassment); 157 CONG. REC. S1363 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (same); 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement 
of Sen. Kyl) (same); 155 CONG. REC. S2715 (Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing 
that the bill would reform “[t]he current administrative review process at the USPTO [which] is 
widely viewed as ineffective and inefficient”); Brian Wm. Higgins, AIA Goal: Reduce Patent 
Litigation, MD. INTELL. PROP. L. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.marylandiplaw.com/2011/10/
articles/ip-news-and-trends/aia-goal-reduce-patent-litigation/, archived at http://perma.cc/AE4Q-
RAB3 (“The new procedures are expected to change the standard for instituting reexaminations 
and reviews, time limits, burdens of proof, and how discovery is taken.”). 
 187 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. 
L. REV. 1341, 1391 (2009) (“One of the most important proposals of reform of the patent regime 
in the United States is the creation of a post-grant opposition/reexamination process for patents in 
the Patent Office. The creation of this new regime has been the subject of intense debate in aca-
demia, in law practice, and in the political spheres.”); Tran, supra note 108, at 610. 
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was the most far-reaching patent reform since the 1952 Patent Act.188 A sig-
nificant portion of the law focused on the post-grant review proceedings.189 
The reform was again justified as necessary to ride the market of “the worst 
patents, which probably never should have been issued.”190 Indeed, the stated 
purpose of the AIA was to “establish a more efficient and streamlined patent 
system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counter-
productive litigation costs”—an almost verbatim repetition of the promises of 
and justifications for earlier reforms.191 To that end, Congress created what 
was termed a “toolbox of new or fortified proceedings” capable of 
“weed[ing] out low quality patents,” and which “includes post-grant review, 
inter partes review, supplemental examination, and derivation proceedings, as 
well as a transitional post-grant review program for certain business methods 
patents.”192 
Before getting into the details of the AIA-created post-issuance review 
proceedings, it is worth pausing to highlight that the AIA was just the latest 
(though apparently not the last)193 attempt to counter the increase of “low 
quality” patents. Yet, it seems that no matter the depth, breadth, or recency of 
any of the reform, the complaint of “low quality” patents persists.194 As dis-
cussed in Part II, the complaint is as old as the patent system itself. But what 
is more problematic is that in nearly 200 years no one has come forth with 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 pt. 1, at 38 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 68; 
Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 67 (2013). 
 189 See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 187, at 1391. 
 190 157 CONG. REC. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 191 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-begins-debate-
on-leahy-smith-america-invents-act, archived at http://perma.cc/KH4T-RU7J; see also notes 32–
119 and accompanying text. 
 192 Tran, supra note 4, at 498–99. 
 193 See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Transparency and 
Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 
113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) STOP Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litiga-
tion and Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 
1013, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); SHIELD Act, 
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 194 See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. H7521 (2013) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“Congress is 
currently pursuing several approaches that have the potential to curb the chilling effect on innova-
tion posed by trolls and improve patent quality.”); P. Andrew Riley et al., The Surprising Breadth 
of Post-Grant Review for Covered-Business-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent 
Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 262 (2014); Michael Beckerman, Innovation Act 
Will Crack Down on Patent Trolls, HILL (Oct. 29, 2013 10:00 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/
congress-blog/technology/187919-innovation-act-will-crack-down-on-patent-trolls, archived at http://
perma.cc/H9PK-GL9J; Timothy B. Lee, Patent Reform Bill Passes the House 325 to 91. Here’s 
What You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/12/05/the-house-votes-on-patent-reform-today-heres-what-you-need-to-know/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4C3L-BN2T. 
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any test or definition of what constitutes a “low quality” patent.195 Further-
more, there has been no indication of how the Patent Office examiners are 
supposed to recognize such patents. Again, most everyone will readily con-
cede that the Patent Office is not infallible, the patentees are not all honest in 
their dealings with the PTO, and that not all prior art in existence is necessari-
ly knowable to either the examiners or the inventors.196 Thus, it is unsurpris-
ing that some of the issued patents are in fact invalid. Nor is it unexpected 
that some of the issued patents are outright silly. The issue, however, is not 
whether invalid or silly patents exist, but whether they actually create prob-
lems for other inventors or investors.197 And on this point, there is simply no 
solid evidence that any problems are precipitated or exacerbated by the “low 
quality” patents.198 The AIA offered solutions without solid empirical evi-
dence of a problem in need of solving. Not only is there no definition of what 
constitutes a “low quality” patent (versus a “medium” or a “high quality” 
one), there is no data to suggest that these patents (however defined) are actu-
ally a source of any major problems. Although stories of patents for methods 
of swinging on a swing199 or exercising a cat200 make for great newspaper 
stories or political soundbites, these anecdotes do not provide sufficient data 
to conclude that “low quality” patents burden the patent system as a whole or 
create a drain on the economy.201 It is unclear what exactly the PTO is sup-
posed to “weed out” with this AIA-created toolbox. 
Furthermore, although the post-issuance review proceedings (whether of 
pre- or post-AIA variety) have ostensibly been designed to eliminate “the 
worst patents,”202 they are not the ones that end up as the focus of these pro-
ceedings.203 As studies have consistently shown, most patents never get as-
                                                                                                                           
 195 See generally Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 
(2014) (discussing the definition of “patent quality”). 
 196 See Rich, supra note 6, at 87–88. Of course, it should be noted that courts are also not 
insured from errors. As Justice Jackson adroitly noted, the Supreme Court is also “not final be-
cause [it is] infallible, but [it is] infallible only because [it is] final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). The mere fact that a patent has been invalidated in liti-
gation does not necessarily (though it may well) indicate that the patent was inherently weak. 
Rather, it may simply be an artifact of the hierarchical justice system where a mistake made by a 
“final” arbiter is “infallible,” but only because of the nature of the arbiter. 
 197 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 199 Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (issued 
Apr. 9, 2002) 
 200 Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (issued Aug. 
22, 1995). 
 201 For example, neither of the above-referenced patents has ever been subject to any litiga-
tion. 
 202 157 CONG. REC. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 203 See Sherry M. Knowles et al., Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the United States, 86 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 623 (2004) (“Third party competitors will always be 
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serted or litigated.204 In that sense, they may not be economically valuable.205 
It is the patents that are economically valuable that get the most attention.206 
If a patent never gets asserted or litigated, it makes little sense for anyone to 
expend any time, money, and effort to invalidate it either through administra-
tive or judicial proceedings.207 The perverse result is that it is the “best” rather 
than the “worst” patents that are subject to post-issuance review.208  
From a rational economic perspective this makes perfect sense. After all, 
neither litigation nor administrative post-issuance review processes are free 
for anyone (though the latter is significantly less expensive for the patent 
challenger). There is little reason for a rational person to expend time and 
money to neutralize a non-threat. Conversely, when a patent is asserted 
against an accused infringer, and the patent is sufficiently important to the 
business of the accused infringer, it makes economic sense to attempt to in-
validate that patent by whatever legal means available. This is especially true 
                                                                                                                           
looking to find a way to invalidate a valuable patent, and making the reexamination process more 
attractive encourages these parties to challenge validity at the USPTO.”); Rader, supra note 174, 
at 1112 (“Over ten percent of those unique patents were reexamined more than once. Some patents 
were reexamined two, three, or even more times—one was submitted to six reexaminations—
presumably because these patents were perceived as valuable.”); Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 
15 (“[M]ultiple reexaminations of the same patent or a reexamination with a parallel reissue appli-
cation are seen frequently, especially if the patent is perceived as being very valuable or is part of 
a hard fought litigation.”). In fact, this phenomenon was predicted forty years ago when early 
mechanisms for post-issuance review were being debated. See McKie, supra note 91, at 100 
(“[T]he risk of undue delay and high expense would seem likely to be the highest to an applicant 
who makes the most valuable invention . . . . An applicant who files on such an invention would 
have to expect opposition”). 
 204 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 117, at 79–83. 
 205 See Allison et al., supra note 167, at 437 (“Many patents are not worth enforcing—either 
because the inventions they cover turn out to be worthless, or because even if the invention has 
economic value the patent does not.”). That correlation, however, is not always true. A patent may 
be quite valuable but not litigated or asserted precisely because all rational actors in the relevant 
market believe it to be invulnerable to an attack. See Malcolm T. “Ty” Meeks & Charles A. Elder-
ing, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in 
Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate 
Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 203 (2010) (“Rational licensees would 
recognize this strength and deem it more cost effective to license than to litigate. Therefore, the 
strongest patents are less likely to make it into the litigation data pool.”); cf. Einer Elhauge & Alex 
Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 290 (2012) (“A strong patent 
deters at-risk entry with certainty during litigation, even though there is a probability of patent 
loss.”). 
 206 See Allison et al., supra note 167, at 441 & n.28 (citing numerous studies concluding that 
“patent litigation correlates strongly with value”). 
 207 Id. at 441 (noting that “[m]ost patents are worth very little to their owners—not even 
enough to pay maintenance fees,” much less to litigate); cf. William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 384–85 (2011) (arguing that many inventors obtain patents not because of 
any economic payoff but because of certain social recognition that comes along with being a “pa-
tentee,” i.e., a “recognized inventor”). 
 208 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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if one particular avenue of invalidation imposes disproportionate costs on the 
adversary.209 In short, the system designed by Congress is working against the 
very goals announced by Congress. 
Despite these inherent problems with the post-issuance review mecha-
nisms, Congress has in fact created a number of new ones. In so doing, it at-
tempted to address some of the shortcomings of the ex parte reexamination 
process identified in the preceding Part. As will be seen in the subsequent 
Part, the attempt failed, largely because the new “tool box” was not a re-
placement, but rather an addition to the existing ex parte reexamination.210 
Additionally, though the new procedures do have preclusive effects (contra 
the ex parte reexamination process),211 the preclusion works on a per peti-
tioner rather than per patent basis.212 To say it another way, a patent that was 
reconfirmed in an AIA-based post-issuance review proceeding can still be 
challenged in an identical or related proceeding, as long as the challenge is by 
someone other than the original challenger. With these caveats in mind, the 
AIA-created post-issuance review proceedings can be discussed. 
The AIA created three distinct post-issuance review proceedings, each 
with its own unique applicability. Nonetheless, given the right set of circum-
stances any and all of these mechanisms can be employed against a single 
patent. The three new mechanisms created by the AIA are (a) post grant re-
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 14–15. 
 210 The AIA eliminated inter partes reexamination. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(c)(3)(C), 125 Stat. 284, 305 (2011); 77 Fed. Reg. 7,075 (Feb. 10, 2012). 
But, that process was rarely used to begin with. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter 
Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579 (2008). The inter partes 
reexamination was replaced with inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). 
 211 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (estoppel provisions for inter partes review); id. § 325(e) (estoppel 
provisions for post-grant review). 
 212 Id. § 315(e) (estopping “[t]he petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent” 
from maintaining any proceedings in the PTO or the courts or the International Trade Commission 
“with respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have 
raised”) (emphasis added); id. § 325(e) (identical language with respect to post grant review). 
Estoppel does apply to the “real party in interest or privy of the petitioner.” Id. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
Furthermore, because estoppel also applies only to the claims that have been subject to one of the 
post-issuance proceedings, the same party can request that the same patent be reviewed multiple 
times, provided that each review petition attacks a different claim or claims. 
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view;213 (b) inter partes review;214 and (c) covered business method review.215 
Each of the procedures is discussed in turn.216 
A. The Post Grant Review 
The post grant review (“PGR”) process resembles the original, mid-
twentieth century proposals for reexamination.217 It is also similar to the op-
position practice in the European Patent Office,218 and indeed was enacted 
with an eye towards making the U.S. patent issuance process similar to the 
European one.219 Any person (other than a patent owner) can file a PGR re-
quest challenging an issued patent on any ground of invalidity.220 This is un-
like the ex parte reexamination, which only considers challenges arguing lack 
of novelty or obviousness.221 In a PGR process, in addition to arguing lack of 
novelty and obviousness, the challenger can argue that the patent is improper-
ly issued by citing any basis which, if they had been previously known, 
would have caused the Patent Office to reject the application in the first 
place.222 The opportunity to file a PGR request exists for patents filed on or 
after March 16, 2013223 and must be exercised within nine months of the pa-
tent issue (or reissue) date.224 Additionally, a PGR cannot be requested if the 
requester, prior to seeking PGR has previously filed a civil action challenging 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Id. §§ 321–329 (2012). 
 214 Id. §§ 311–319. 
 215 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31. The AIA also created a 
fourth procedure called “Supplemental Examination,” but that is only available to the patentee 
himself for the purposes of allowing the Patent Office to consider, reconsider, or correct infor-
mation believed to be relevant to the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 257. No one other than the patentee 
can request supplemental examination, and therefore the discussion of this particular process is 
omitted. 
 216 See infra notes 217–292 and accompanying text. 
 217 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing early reexamination proposals). 
 218 See generally Opposition Procedure in the EPO, OFFICIAL JOURNAL EPO 148 (Mar. 
2001), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/03_01/03_1481.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/473A-86BZ (discussing European Patent Office opposition proceedings). 
 219 See Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They 
Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 96 (2012). 
 220 35 U.S.C. § 321. 
 221 Compare id. § 321(b) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as un-
patentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or 
(3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”), with id. § 302 (“Any 
person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on 
the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301.”). 
 222 Id. § 321(b). 
 223 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 311 
(2011). PGR is also available to a small subset of patents that were filed prior to March 16, 2013, 
specifically patents eligible for “Covered Business Method Review” discussed infra, and patents 
that are involved in an interference proceeding as of September 16, 2012 (the effective date of the 
AIA). Id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31. 
 224 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 
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the validity of the patent.225 On the other hand, it is permissible to file a PGR 
request first, and thereafter file a declaratory judgment civil action.226 While 
the PGR is pending, however, the civil action is automatically stayed unless 
the patentee either waives a stay or brings his own infringement counter-
claims.227 Importantly, in a PGR, the challenger must identify the patent 
claims he believes to be improperly issued.228 In other words, much like in 
litigation, the patent is not challenged and evaluated as a whole, but rather 
each specific claim is challenged and evaluated separately.229 
Once the PGR is requested and the patentee is notified of the request, the 
patentee has a right to file, within three months, a preliminary response in an 
attempt to convince the Patent Office that the PGR petition ought to be reject-
ed.230 Once the response is filed, the Patent Office has up to three months to 
decide whether to grant the PGR petition.231 No appeal (save for a motion for 
reconsideration) lies from the decision to either grant or deny the petition.232 
If a petition is denied, however, a new one can be filed (provided that less 
than nine months have elapsed from the patent’s issue).233 The PTO may only 
grant the PGR petition if the petition “demonstrate[s] that it is more likely 
than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatenta-
ble.”234 Alternatively, the PGR may be ordered to resolve “a novel or unset-
tled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.”235  
If the Patent Office grants the petition and institutes the PGR proceed-
ings, the matter goes to trial before the PTAB,236 which must render its final 
decision within twelve months of the decision to institute the proceedings.237 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Id. § 325(a)(1). 
 226 Id. § 325(a)(2). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. § 322(a)(3). 
 229 See Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that 
“each claim must be separately considered” in a patent validity analysis); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282(a) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent 
form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims . . . .”). 
 230 35 U.S.C. § 323. Alternatively, the patent owner may disclaim some of the claims at issue, 
thus obviating the need for a PGR. Id. § 253(a). 
 231 Id. § 324(c). 
 232 Id. § 324(e). 
 233 See 1 ROBERT GREENE STERNE ET AL., PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION 436 (2012 ed.). As 
discussed in greater detail below, the denial of the PGR petition creates no estoppel for the peti-
tioner, and therefore leaves him the opportunity to avail himself of other post-issuance review 
mechanisms. Id. 
 234 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). 
 235 Id. § 324(b). 
 236 The PTAB was previously known as the Board of Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See 
supra note 144 and accompanying text. The AIA greatly expanded the Board’s responsibilities 
necessitating a tremendous increase in the staffing of the Board by newly minted Administrative 
Patent Judges (“APJ”). See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(4) (adding “conduct[ing] inter partes reviews and 
post-grant reviews” to the duties of PTAB); Michelle K. Lee, Progress Continues with Our Patent 
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The trial phase of PGR is in some ways similar to a traditional trial, 
though perhaps a bit more abbreviated and streamlined. For example, discov-
ery in the form of expert reports, cross-examination of expert witnesses, pro-
duction of documents or things inconsistent with a party’s asserted position, 
and the like is permitted,238 though of course it has to be accomplished rather 
quickly given the deadline for the ultimate resolution of the issues. Motions 
practice is also permitted, but limited both by the timeframe and by the re-
quirement that the Board’s permission must be obtained before the filing of 
any motion.239  
The two key differences, from the petitioner’s perspective, between tri-
als at the PTAB and in the district court are a lower burden of proof and 
broader claim construction. Whereas in the district courts patents can only be 
invalidated upon the showing of “clear and convincing evidence,”240 in the 
PTAB proceedings the petitioner carries his burden by satisfying the “pre-
ponderance of evidence” standard.241 Not only is the standard lower, but it is 
easier to meet this standard. Whereas in the district court claims are construed 
by reference to what a person having ordinary skill in the art would under-
stand,242 at the PTAB they are given their “broadest reasonable construc-
tion.”243 The broader the claim construction, the more likely it is to sweep 
prior art within its ambit.244 These two key differences between PTAB and 
district court litigation make it much easier for the patent challenger to prevail 
in the former forum.  
On the other hand, from the perspective of the patentee the key differ-
ence in the PTAB proceedings from those in the district court is the patentee’s 
                                                                                                                           
Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 02, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/
blog/director/entry/progress_continues_with_our_patent, archived at https://perma.cc/HNR7-9P
UG?type=source (“We are moving fast toward our goal of adding 60 new judges for a grand total 
of 200 by June 1st.”). These new APJs themselves often have limited experience in practice. It is a 
rather dubious proposition that having relatively young attorneys (i.e., with less than a decade of 
experience in litigating cases) pass on the validity of fairly complex claims will “improve patent 
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.” See Press Release, Sen. 
Patrick Leahy, supra note 191. 
 237 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11). For good cause shown, the period may be extended for an addi-
tional six months for a total of eighteen months from the date the petition was granted. Id. 
 238 Id. § 326(a)(5). Though discovery is permitted, it is more limited than that which would 
otherwise be available in litigation. See Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 40. 
 239 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(a)–(b) (2014). 
 240 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
 241 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). 
 242 See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).  
 243 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). 
 244 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 
95 (2013). 
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ability to amend his claims in the former,245 but not in the latter forum.246 In 
traditional litigation, the claims are either valid or invalid,247 but in the PTO, 
if the patentee is faced with what he believes is a potentially invalidating ar-
gument or prior art, he can amend his claims to narrow or clarify them, thus 
saving them from cancellation.248 To be sure, the challenger can oppose the 
claim amendment by arguing that even as amended the claims must fail.249 In 
the face of such opposition additional discovery on the amended claims may 
be permitted, and the Board will render a decision on the motion to amend the 
claims.250  
Once all of the submissions are complete, the Board will render a final 
judgment on the reviewed claims.251 That judgment will either invalidate or 
confirm the claims at issue.252 Any dissatisfied party can then appeal the deci-
sion of the PTAB to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.253 But, 
unlike the proceedings before the PTAB, the proceedings in the Federal Cir-
cuit are not expedited and are heard on the court’s regular schedule. 
Unlike the ex parte reexamination proceedings, the PGR carries with it 
estoppel consequences.254 A petitioner who has requested a PGR will be es-
topped from asserting the same claims and theories that were rejected by the 
PTAB.255 The estoppel applies both to litigation and administrative proceed-
ings, that is to say that a petitioner cannot request another administrative re-
view (whether a PGR or any other kind) or judicial determination on the same 
                                                                                                                           
 245 35 U.S.C. § 326(d). 
 246 See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“[W]e do not permit courts to redraft claims.”). 
 247 Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“We have also admonished 
against judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity.”). 
 248 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a). Although the patent owner has a statutory right to submit a 
“reasonable number of substitute claims,” see id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(1)(B), the motion 
“will not result automatically in entry of the proposed amendment into the patent.” Changes to 
Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional 
Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,692 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 249 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). The patent owner may then reply to the opposition to the motion to 
amend. Id. 
 250 See 1 STERNE ET AL., supra note 233, at 578. See generally 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (describ-
ing the sequence of the PGR and IPR proceedings). 
 251 35 U.S.C. § 328(a). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. §§ 141–144. 
 254 Id. § 325(e). 
 255 Id. The estoppel rule applies to the patentee as well, as it always has, for the simple reason 
that if the claims are held invalid and cancelled by the PTO, the patentee would simply be unable 
to assert these now-canceled claims in any other fora. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–50 (1971). 
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issue that has been finally adjudicated by the Board.256 But the estoppel pro-
visions on their face are broader than that. They apply not only to the actual 
theories of invalidity that have been raised and adjudicated by the Board, but 
also to theories that “reasonably could have [been] raised.”257 The parties 
covered by the estoppel include not only the petitioner, but also the real party 
in interest (that must be identified in every petition)258 and anyone in privity 
with the petitioner.259 At the same time, other third parties are not estopped 
from challenging the same claims on the same theories that have already been 
addressed by the PTAB either by way of another round of administrative re-
view proceedings or in a litigation forum. Nor is the initial petitioner estopped 
from seeking another round of administrative or judicial proceedings with 
respect to different claims in the patent.260 
It should be recognized that in creating the PGR process Congress did 
attempt to correct some of the major flaws in the ex parte reexamination pro-
cess. Specifically, it put a tight limit on the length of the proceedings261 and 
the timing during which the PGR could be instituted,262 it raised (at least 
nominally) the standard for granting the petition for instituting the PGR re-
view,263 created estoppel provisions,264 and made the process an inter partes 
one to ensure that the legal costs to the challenger are roughly commensurate 
to the legal costs borne by the patentee.265 
What Congress gave with one hand, however, it took away with the oth-
er. For example, the seemingly quick turnaround time required by statute is 
actually not that quick. Taking into account the time for filing a PGR request, 
the time allowed for opposition, and the time the PTO has to decide whether 
to grant the petition, the total time that a patent can spend waiting for resolu-
tion of the process is up to twenty-seven months (or thirty-three months if the 
deadline for rendering the decision in extended). This timeframe is roughly 
equivalent to the district court litigation timeframe.266 Therefore, although 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Id. Even though ex parte reexamination can be requested anonymously, 35 U.S.C. § 301(e) 
(2012), the new rules require the party requesting reexamination to certify that he is not barred 
from doing so by AIA’s estoppel provisions. 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(6) (2014). 
 257 35 U.S.C. § 325(e). 
 258 Id. § 322(a)(2). 
 259 Id. § 325(e). 
 260 Id. § 325(e)(1) (“The petitioner . . . may not request or maintain a proceeding before the 
Office with respect to [the reviewed] claim . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 261 Id. § 326(a)(11). 
 262 Id. § 321(c). 
 263 Id. § 324(a). 
 264 Id. § 325(e). 
 265 Id. § 326. The patentee, however, may ultimately have higher overall costs as the uncer-
tainty surrounding his patent rights may depress the value of the patent. See infra notes 362–449 
and accompanying text. 
 266 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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PGR may be less expensive and more streamlined, it is not necessarily faster, 
especially if one considers the time spent in additional litigation resolving the 
issue of infringement on the claims that have survived the PGR process. 
Similarly, though PGR proceedings carry with them the promise of es-
toppel, in reality the promise is quite limited. First, the estoppel is only a one-
way street. It applies to reexaminations that have been instituted after a deci-
sion has been rendered in a PGR, but it does not apply in reverse. A challeng-
er can request a reexamination and then a PGR without a fear of estoppel. 
Indeed, one can request multiple reexaminations and then follow them up 
with a PGR. An objection could be had that such a sequence of events is un-
likely given that PGR has to be instituted within nine months of the patent’s 
grant, and it is unlikely that a reexamination would be complete. True 
enough, but PGR is not the only post-issuance review procedure. The other 
avenue that the challenger may explore is the new inter partes review process. 
B. Inter Partes Review 
In addition to the PGR, the AIA created a second mechanism to adminis-
tratively challenge issued patents—the inter partes review (“IPR”).267 Though 
in many ways similar to PGR, this mechanism has some additional limita-
tions. Much like the PGR, the IPR can be filed by any person (other than a 
patentee) and can be used to challenge any claim of an issued patent.268 Un-
like PGR, however, and similar to ex parte reexamination, the asserted bases 
for invalidity are limited to lack of novelty under section 102 and obviousness 
under section 103.269 Claims cannot be challenged under any other grounds 
(whereas in a PGR the challenger may argue any grounds for invalidity).270 
The earliest IPR can be requested is at any point during the patent’s lifetime, 
but no earlier than nine months after the patent’s issue date, i.e., after the time 
for requesting PGR has expired.271 An IPR request can be filed against any 
patent, irrespective of the date of issuance,272 and it will be granted if there is 
a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at 
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”273 The process for filing the 
initial petition, the ability to respond to it (and the timeframe for doing so), 
and the discovery process are the same as with the PGR.274 The same bars 
                                                                                                                           
 267 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. 
 268 Id. § 311(a). 
 269 Id. § 311(b). 
 270 Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2014). 
 271 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1). If PGR proceedings have been instituted, then an IPR request can-
not be filed until the termination of PGR. Id. § 311(c)(2). 
 272 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(2). 
 273 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
 274 Compare id. §§ 311–319 (inter partes review), with id. §§ 321–329 (post-grant review). 
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also apply, i.e., no IPR application can be filed if the petitioner has previously 
filed a civil action challenging the validity of the same claim.275 As in PGR, 
the Patent Office has three months to decide whether to order a full trial be-
fore the PTAB.276 If ordered, the trial must be completed within twelve 
months of the granting of the IPR petition.277 
The IPR is governed by the same estoppel provisions as the PGR, limit-
ing the petitioner from filing additional judicial or administrative challenges 
to the claims which were subject to IPR if the new challenge is based “on any 
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during” the 
IPR.278 Though the language of the IPR estoppel provision is identical to the 
language of the PGR estoppel provision,279 given that only novelty and obvi-
ousness challenges can be raised in IPR proceedings, the scope of the estop-
pel is much narrower in practice. 
The similarity between PGR and IPR makes all of the criticisms with re-
spect to the former procedure applicable to the latter, except that due to the 
more limited nature of IPR and therefore IPR estoppel, these criticism apply 
with even greater force. 
C. Covered Business Method Review 
The final post-issuance review procedure grew out of lawmakers’ frus-
tration with business method patents in general and patents that covered the 
method for electronically processing and clearing personal checks in particu-
lar. An amendment proposed by Senator Jeff Sessions that would have essen-
tially allowed financial institutions to infringe patents without fear of liability 
was the precursor to the covered business method review (“CBMR”).280 Alt-
hough the Sessions proposal was defeated, the distaste for business method 
patents among senators prevailed. In commenting on the amendment that cre-
ated the CBMR review process, Senator Chuck Schumer stated: 
Business method patents are anathema to the protection the patent 
system provides because they apply not to novel products or ser-
vices but to abstract and common concepts of how to do busi-
ness. . . . The holders of business method patents then attempt to 
                                                                                                                           
 275 Id. § 315(a)(1). 
 276 Id. § 314(b). 
 277 Id. § 316(a)(11). The deadline can be extended for an additional six months “for good 
cause shown.” Id. 
 278 Id. § 315(e). 
 279 Compare id. (inter partes review), with id. § 325(e) (post-grant review). 
 280 See Stephen T. Schreiner & Andrew J. Baca, Status of Intellectual Property Reform Legis-
lation in the Congress and How It May Affect How Banks Acquire and Enforce Patents, 124 
BANKING L.J. 920, 923 (2007); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Move to Grant Banks Immunity 
Against Patent Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A22. 
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extract settlements . . . by suing . . . in plaintiff-friendly courts and 
tying [the defendants] up in years of extremely costly litigation. 
This is not a small problem. . . . This is not right, it is not fair, and it 
is taking desperately needed money and energy out of the economy 
and putting it into the hands of a few litigants. . . . The [CMBR 
process] . . . will allow companies that are the target of one of these 
frivolous business method patent lawsuits to go back to the PTO 
and demonstrate, with the appropriate prior art, that the patent 
shouldn’t have been issued in the first place. That way bad patents 
can be knocked out in an efficient administrative proceeding, 
avoiding costly litigation.281 
It is noteworthy that despite Senator Schumer’s claim that the business 
method patents are “anathema to the protection the patent system provides,” 
and that they only exist to target innocent companies in “frivolous business 
method patent lawsuits,” the patents that initially gave rise to the CBMR pro-
vision have been repeatedly upheld in litigation and reexamination.282 None-
theless, Congress thought it necessary (again without any significant evidence 
of a problem) to subject business method patents to a heightened level of 
scrutiny. Thus CBMR was born. 
Given the origin of the CBMR provision it is unsurprising that “covered 
business method” is defined in a seemingly narrow yet sufficiently amor-
phous way, leaving its sweep quite undefined. Under the statute, patents are 
subject to this procedure if they “claim[] a method or corresponding appa-
ratus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, 
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that 
                                                                                                                           
 281 157 CONG. REC. S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). 
 282 The DataTreasury patents for check imaging that were the impetus for Sen. Sessions’ 
initial proposal were in fact subject to reexamination. See U.S. Patent No. 6,032,137 (filed May 
19, 1998) (issued Feb. 29, 2000), reexamination certificate 6063rd (issued Dec. 12, 2007); U.S. 
Patent No. 5,910,988 (filed Aug. 27, 1997) (issued June 8, 1999), reexamination certificate 
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CBM2014-00020 and CBM2014-00088. See Fiserv, Inc. v. DataTreasury Corp., CBM2014-
00088, Paper No. 6 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 4, 2014) (Decision: Institution of CMBR); Fidelity Nat’l Info. 
Servs., Inc., CBM2014-00020, Paper No. 13 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2014) (Decision: Institution of 
CMBR); Jack Henry & Assocs. v. DataTreasury Corp., CBM2014-00056, Paper No. 17 (P.TA.B. 
July 10, 2014) (Decision: Institution of CMBR). Similarly, the ’988 patent is subject to two insti-
tuted CBMRs. See Jack Henry & Assocs. v. DataTreasury Corp., CBM2014-00057, Paper No. 17 
(P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014) (Decision: Institution of CMBR); Fidelity Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. 
DataTreasury Corp., CBM2014-00021, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2014) (Decision: Institu-
tion of CMBR). There is also one other request for review pending. See Petition for Review, 
Fiserv, Inc. v. DataTreasury Corp., CBM2014-00087 (filed Mar. 12, 2014). 
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the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”283 Yet, “fi-
nancial services” is left undefined. The PTO has stated that it will interpret 
this section broadly to include “activities that are financial in nature, inci-
dental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.”284 Sim-
ilarly, the AIA does not define “technological innovations.” The PTO at-
tempted to provide a more concrete definition of this term, but instead con-
cluded that it will proceed on a “case by case basis” and consider “whether 
the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is 
novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using 
a technical solution.”285 Unfortunately, the PTO’s attempts to better define the 
types of patents subject to CBMR resulted in an essentially tautological defi-
nition and therefore cast a cloud of uncertainty over a broad range of patents. 
The CBMR is a transitional program that is meant to last for only eight 
years286 and during its existence will, for the most part, mirror the PGR.287 
Unlike PGR that is available only within the first nine months post-issuance, 
and only for patents with a filing date after March 16, 2013, CBMR is availa-
ble at any time for all patents that fit within the “covered business method” 
definition.288 Furthermore, unlike PGR where there are no special standing 
requirements, to invoke a CBMR, the petitioner must have been sued for or 
charged with the infringement of the patent in question.289 The PTO views 
these requirements as mirroring the requirements to bring a declaratory judg-
ment action in the federal district court.290 At the same time, if the petitioner 
has filed a declaratory judgment action he is barred from seeking CBMR in 
the PTO. 
Although the grounds for seeking CBMR are essentially coextensive 
with the grounds for seeking a PGR (i.e., a petitioner can challenge a “cov-
ered business method” on any ground of invalidity) the CBMR estoppel pro-
visions are much less far-reaching. Most importantly, estoppel does not attach 
to arguments that “could have been raised” in CBMR proceedings;291 rather it 
only attaches to arguments actually raised. Second, estoppel seemingly does 
                                                                                                                           
 283 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 
(2011). 
 284 Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,735 
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 285 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2014). 
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not apply to the privy of the petitioner in subsequent civil actions or the Inter-
national Trade Commission proceedings.292 The CBMR suffers from all the 
same faults of the PGR, and in view of the limited scope of estoppel is even 
more problematic. 
IV. THE EARLY DATA ON POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW MECHANISMS 
The previous Part set out the AIA created mechanisms for post-issuance 
review of issued patents as well as pointed out potential problem areas with 
these mechanisms. This Part will examine the early data on post-issuance 
review processes to evaluate whether the problems identified ante have in-
deed begun to plague the newly created procedures, while the following Part 
will present data on the negative effect these procedures are having on the 
patentees. Section A analyzes the data on ex parte reexamination.293 Next, Sec-
tion B briefly explains the lack of data for PGR proceedings.294 Finally, Section 
C examines IPR data,295 while Section D then analyzes CBMR data.296 
A. Ex Parte Reexamination 
Though ex parte reexamination was not an AIA creation, it is worth dis-
cussing here because its continued availability and lack of estoppel provisions 
affect the overall post-issuance review system. Because the ex parte reexami-
nation process has been in existence for over thirty years, there is significant 
data that can be analyzed. 
Since July 1981, over 12,000 requests for ex parte reexamination have 
been received in the PTO.297 Of those, approximately 70% were requested by 
someone other than the patentee.298 The technological fields of the patents for 
which requests were received have been by and large evenly spread between 
mechanical, chemical, and electrical arts as defined by the PTO.299 Over 90% 
of all petitions resulted in the initiation of a re-exam.300 Despite the high rate 
of re-exam initiation implying that a “substantial new question of patentabil-
ity” exists with respect to the claims at issue, nearly a quarter of all patents 
                                                                                                                           
 292 Id. Whether the omission of the word “privy” was purposeful or a mere drafter’s error is 
unclear. Nonetheless, unlike PGR and IPR which estop “petitioner . . . or the real party in interest 
or privy of the petitioner,” the CBMR only estops “[t]he petitioner . . . or the petitioner’s real party 
in interest.” See 2 STERNE ET AL., supra note 233, at 40. 
 293 See infra notes 297–312 and accompanying text. 
 294 See infra notes 313–318 and accompanying text. 
 295 See infra notes 319–345 and accompanying text. 
 296 See infra notes 346–357 and accompanying text. 
 297 See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1; REEXAMINATIONS 
FY 2014, supra note 176, at 1.  
 298 EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
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exit the reexamination with all claims confirmed.301 That number is consistent 
irrespective of who has requested the reexamination—the patentee or the 
owner. An additional two-thirds of the patents exit reexamination with some 
changes made to the claims.302 Only 12% of all patents that enter reexamina-
tion fail to receive the reexamination certificate.303 Given such a low rate of 
invalidation, the system either fails to “weed out low quality patents,” or the 
patents issued by the office, contrary to popular views, do not actually suffer 
from “low quality.”  
The system, however, does impose significant costs on patent owners, 
especially on the owners of particularly valuable patents.304 About a third of 
all patents that are put through reexamination are also the subject of litiga-
tion.305 Because it is common to stay litigation proceedings while reexamina-
tion is ongoing,306 reexamination can serve to prolong litigation and increase 
its cost to the patentee.307 Given the statistics, the odds favor a patent 
reemerging from a reexamination unscathed or nearly so and the accused in-
fringer has limited hope to prevail. What the accused or putative infringer can 
do by requesting reexamination is to force the patentee to spend time and re-
sources to defend the patent in two separate fora.308 These costs burgeon fur-
ther when putative infringers file multiple patent reexamination requests. The 
numbers suggest that this approach is far from an uncommon one. Between 
2000 and 2009, there were 5680 reexamination proceedings, but they con-
cerned only 2560 unique patents, meaning that each patent had on average 
over two reexamination requests lodged against it.309 Of these patents, 11% 
had already been reexamined more than once, with some having been reex-
amined as many as four, five, or even six times.310 With each reexamination 
having a mean length of twenty months,311 a patent can be held in a state of 
                                                                                                                           
 301 Id. at 2. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. 
 304 See Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 14–15. 
 305 EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 125, at 1. 
 306 See Scott M. Daniels & Kate Addison, Why Wait for Oppositions?, 47 IDEA 343, 355 
(2007); Mercado, supra note 17, at 114. 
 307 See Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 9. 
 308 See, e.g., Amy L. Magas, Note, When Politics Interfere with Patent Reexamination, 4 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 160, 173 (2004); Tremesha S. Willis, Note, Patent Reexamina-
tion Post Litigation: It’s Time to Set the Rules Straight, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 597, 610 (2005); cf. 
Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 183 (2006) (“Another example of a relatively 
inexpensive (for the infringer) form of ‘litigating’ is the ex partes reexamination. On the other side 
of the equation, the costs for the patentee may be quite high.”). 
 309 Sterne et al., supra note 171, at 14–15. 
 310 Id. at 15. 
 311 See CRU DATA FY 2012–13, supra note 176, at 11. 
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uncertainty for years at a time, which significantly cuts down that patent’s 
effective life.312 
The post-AIA practice is unlikely to change. Though the number of ex 
parte reexamination requests has fallen after the AIA-created procedures be-
came available (in part because of a significant fee increase for the filing of 
the ex parte reexamination petition), the overall approach to the process and 
the legal advice dispensed to putative infringers remain the same. 
B. Post Grant Review 
As of March 1, 2015, there have not been any PGR proceedings institut-
ed.313 Strange as it may seem, there is a simple explanation. PGR is not avail-
able for any patent with a filing date prior to March 16, 2013.314 Because it 
takes a significant amount of time for a patent application to be evaluated and 
granted,315 it is unlikely that many patents with such a late filing date have 
already issued. After all, the average pendency of a patent application to first 
action is about eighteen months,316 meaning that patent applications filed on 
March 16, 2013 are unlikely to be acted upon until August 2014. Given that 
the average pendency of an application to issuance is nearly twenty-seven 
months,317 and that challengers will have up to nine months to decide whether 
to seek a PGR,318 we should not expect to see first statistics on that process 
until about late 2015 or early 2016. 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See, e.g., RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30 (2003); Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The 
Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 353 
(2010); Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and Policy 
Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 551 (2011) (“Effective patent life is often uncertain because 
. . . there is uncertainty associated with the resolution of any patent challenges.”). 
 313 A few petitions, however, are pending. See, e.g., Netsirv LLC v. Boxbee, Inc., PGR2015-
0009, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2015) (Petition for Review), Am. Simmental Assoc. v. 
Leachman Cattle of Colo., LLC, PGR2015-0005, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2015) (Petition 
for Review); Am. Simmental Assoc. v. Leachman Cattle of Colo., LLC, PGR2015-0003, Paper 
No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2014) (Petition for Review). 
 314 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 311 
(2011). 
 315 According to the UPSTO, the average pendency of a patent application until the first office 
action is 18.3 months and the average total pendency is 26.9 months. See Data Visualization Center, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2TNN-5QEP (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012). 
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C. Inter Partes Review 
The IPR became available on September 16, 2012.319 In the first twenty-
nine months of the process, nearly 2300 petitions were filed, with the lion’s 
share (over 60%) targeting patents in electrical and computer technology.320 
Of these petitions, the PTO has preliminarily decided whether or not to insti-
tute a trial in just under 60% of cases.321 The PTO actually ordered into trial 
around 80% of the petitions it has reviewed.322 The 80% overall grant rate for 
IPR is appreciably lower than the 93% grant for ex parte reexamination, sug-
gesting that Congress did succeed in raising the threshold for instituting post-
issuance review proceedings. That having been said, and though the current 
trend is favorable, the data on ex parte reexamination is richer than that for 
IPRs so the numbers may yet equalize. 
As of January 18, 2015, the PTO has resolved 163 IPR petitions through 
final written decisions.323 Of those, only twenty-four decisions confirmed all 
litigated claims.324 Furthermore, of these petitions, fifteen involved only five 
separate disputes, i.e., several decisions stemmed from multi-patent disputes 
between the same parties. In comparison, the PTO cancelled all claims in 121 
cases.325 A split decision (cancelling some and upholding other claims) was 
reached in the remaining eighteen cases. Looking at the total number of 
claims in all IPRs that have been considered by the PTAB versus the total 
number of claims that survived, the same general picture emerges—a nearly 
75% invalidation rate.  
On one hand, these numbers may suggest that the PTAB is doing a good 
job weeding out meritorious petitions from non-meritorious ones at the initia-
tion stage. On the other hand, these numbers may suggest that it is too easy to 
invalidate a duly issued patent in IPR proceedings. A recent study suggested 
                                                                                                                           
 319 See Inter Partes Disputes, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patent/
laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/inter-partes-disputes, archived at https://perma.cc/
SAB9-4AYH?type=source (last visited Apr. 11, 2015); Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Pro-
gress: Statistics (as of Jan. 8, 2015), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 1, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/aia_statistics_01_08_2015.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3ZQZ-VGE6
?type=pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter AIA Progress Statistics]. 
 320 AIA Progress Statistics, supra note 319, at 1. 
 321 Id. at 2. 
 322 Id. This number is arrived at by not counting petition joinder orders as denials. Whether 
they are counted together with orders to proceed to trial or excluded from the total, the percent-
ages stay the same. 
 323 Because some cases were joined, the number of decisions is actually lower than the num-
ber of cases resolved. At the same time, some patents are subject to multiple IPR proceedings and 
multiple separate written decisions. 
 324 The data was compiled by reviewing every decision issued by the PTAB and comparing 
the number of claims before the Board to the number of claims that the Board invalidated. 
 325 In one of the cases, three of the claims on which the IPR trial was instituted were cancelled 
during a concurrent ex parte reexamination. See Denso Corp. v. Beacon Navigation GmbH, 
IPR2013-00026, Paper No. 34, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2014) (Final Written Decision). 
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that about 28% of patents are invalidated if subjected to the proper anticipa-
tion or obviousness analysis (the only issues which may be considered in an 
IPR proceeding).326 The numbers are estimated to be a bit higher for 
“[p]atents covering software and business methods,”327 (which are dispropor-
tionally represented in IPR)328 but are still significantly below the actual IPR 
invalidation rate. Studies also show that the invalidation rate in the district 
courts is significantly lower (about 46%) than the current IPR rates.329 That is 
doubly significant because in district court a patent can be invalidated on 
grounds other than lack of novelty or obviousness.330 Indeed a study indicates 
that in litigation, patents were found to be anticipated and/or obvious just over 
one third of the time, i.e., at half the rate found by the PTAB.331 This of 
course is not unexpected, because the PTAB applies a lower standard of proof 
for invalidity332 and uses a broader claim construction than courts do.333 Fur-
thermore, it is possible that especially in this first wave of IPR petitions the 
challenged patents are those that are of most suspect validity and that with 
time the numbers will even out. That explanation, however, has its own prob-
lems. 
One reason to doubt that the patents in the first wave of IPR are particu-
larly “weak” is the fact that a number of them have been through litigation or 
reexamination or both. Thus, 15% of patents in IPR have been involved in 
and emerged from a previous reexamination. In other words, the Patent Office 
had already taken a “second look” under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard and has reconfirmed the claims. Yet, even this added level of scruti-
ny has not added to the security of patentees’ rights. Over 8% of IPR final 
decisions have involved patents that have previously prevailed in reexamina-
                                                                                                                           
 326 Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of 
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2013). 
 327 The study estimates the “correct” invalidity rate to be 39% for software patents and 56% 
for business methods. Id. at 7. 
 328 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 329 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Pa-
tents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998); see also Donald R. Dunner, The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 186–87 (1985); Mark 
A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 (1994); 
Merges, supra note 55, at 822. 
 330 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (providing legal defenses against patent infringement); 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars enforce-
ment of a patent.”). 
 331 Allison & Lemley, supra note 329, at 209. 
 332 Compare 35 U.S.C.§ 316(e) (establishing “preponderance of the evidence” standard in 
IPR proceedings), with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that in 
litigation patents can only be invalidated upon a clear and convincing showing of invalidity). 
 333 See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.  
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tion.334 Of these patents that have already received a second favorable look, 
60% were fully invalidated in the IPR proceedings, and 8% were partially 
invalidated, for a per claim invalidation rate of 83%.335  
Furthermore, only 31% of IPR petitions rely only on “new” (i.e., previ-
ously unconsidered) prior art. Three percent rely on old art or art that was 
already considered by the patent examiner and not found to be invalidating, 
and 66% rely on a mixture of old and new art. But, all of the petitions are 
successful at high levels. Of the final written decisions, petitions relying on 
new art only and old art only result in the identical invalidation rate of 93%, 
while those relying on mixture of old and new art result in the invalidation 
rate of 81%. This suggests that not only does the issued patent itself not pro-
vide secure property rights, but that the consideration of prior art references 
by the examiner does little to enhance the security of these rights. 
Nearly one third of all patents in the IPR proceedings are subject to mul-
tiple IPR requests.336 Although some of these petitions are joined and result in 
a single proceeding, that is not always the case, and because estoppel provi-
sions are claim, rather than patent, specific, subsequent IPR requests can be 
                                                                                                                           
 334 A number of other patents had inter partes reexamination instituted against them and then 
terminated on favorable terms due to prevailing in concurrent litigation. 
 335 Again, the number of observations is small (thirteen out of 163 decisions involved patents 
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IPR2013-00419, Paper No. 3 (P.T.A.B. July 12, 2013) (Petition for Review); Toyota Motor Corp. 
v. Am. Vehicular Scis. LLC, IPR2013-00424, Paper No. 2 (P.TA.B. July 12, 2013). Toyota par-
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Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis., LLC, IPR2013-00419, Paper No. 59, at 28 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 12, 
2015) (Final Written Decision); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis., LLC, IPR2013-
00424, Paper No. 50, at 27 (P.TA.B. Jan. 12, 2015) (Final Written Decision). Twenty-three 
claims, however, were reconfirmed during the IPR. See Toyota Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular 
Scis., LLC, IPR2013-00419, Paper No. 59, at 29 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 12, 2015) (Final Written Deci-
sion); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis., LLC, IPR2013-00424, Paper No. 50, at 27 
(P.TA.B. Jan. 12, 2015) (Final Written Decision). Apparently to protect itself against such an 
eventuality, Toyota also filed ex parte reexamination requests, both of which remain pending as of 
the date of this writing. See generally Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 
6,772,057 (App. No. 90/020,077, Nov. 14, 2013) (on file at USPTO); Request for Ex Parte Reex-
amination of U.S. Patent No. 5,845,000 (App. No. 90/020,078, Nov. 14, 2013) (on file at 
USPTO). 
 336 See Harnessing Patent Office Litigation Vol. VIII: A Look at Twenty-Seven Months of Inter 
Partes Review Proceedings Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, HARNESS 
DICKEY, http://ipr-pgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/IPR-PGR-Report-Vol.-8.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4X9G-ELT5 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
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(and are) brought against the same patent.337 On average, each IPR petition 
challenges only about 50% of the claims in any given patent.338 
An additional interesting data point is the PTAB’s treatment of motions 
to amend claims.339 Although the availability of such a motion is an ad-
vantage that the patentee enjoys in the PTO proceedings over the district 
court litigation,340 it appears that at least so far, the advantage is purely 
ephemeral. Out of all the final decisions, the motion to amend was granted 
only twice,341 one of which was with respect to a patent owned by the U.S. 
Government,342 and absent opposition from the challenger.343 In every other 
case (forty-eight in total),344 the motion to amend was denied. Therefore, at 
least in these early stages, it appears that the advantage to the patentee stem-
ming from his ability to amend the claims is merely illusory. What was meant 
to be the counter-balance to the challenger’s lower burden of proof in practice 
does not exist. 
Before moving on to the next Part, an important caveat to these statistics 
must be acknowledged. About 15% of all IPR requests filed were ultimately 
(privately and confidentially) settled between the filer and the patentee, re-
sulting in termination of the proceedings before the PTAB.345 Because these 
settlements are confidential, it is hard to know whether they resulted in a cov-
enant not to sue, a license, or any other agreement. Nonetheless, what may be 
going on is that putative infringers use the petition for IPR as leverage to 
achieve better and lower-price licensing terms. 
                                                                                                                           
 337 See id. The PTAB rendered decisions in 164 cases by January 18, 2015, thirty seven of 
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 343 See Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., IPR2013-00124, Paper No. 12, 
at 2 (P.T.A.B. May 20, 2014) (Final Written Decision). 
 344 In the remaining cases, no motion to amend was made. 
 345 See AIA Progress Statistics, supra note 319, at 1, 2 (noting 340 settlements out of 2323 
total petitions and counting those cases as “final dispositions”). In an additional fifty cases (or 
about two percent of the total), the patentee declined to defend the challenged claims and request-
ed an entry of an adverse judgment. Id. 
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D. Covered Business Method Review 
The early statistics on the CBMR are scarcer than those on IPR. Though 
both CBMR and IPR became available on the same date, the universe of pa-
tents subject to the former procedure is narrower than the universe of patents 
subject to the latter. Since September 16, 2012, 279 CBMR petitions have 
been filed and, as of January 8, 2015, the PTO has issued decisions on wheth-
er to institute a full trial in approximately sixty percent of these petitions.346 
Of these preliminarily adjudicated petitions, the PTO instituted trials in more 
than three quarters of all cases.347 Twenty-one of these cases have been com-
pleted and resulted in a final written decision. The statistics are even more 
staggering than the statistics for IPR. Every petition, but two,348 has resulted 
in every challenged claim being held unpatentable and cancelled. One case 
resulted in three out of twenty,349 and another in twelve out of twenty-eight 
challenged claims surviving.350 The per-case invalidation rate in CBMR is 
over ninety percent and per-claim rate is over ninety-four percent. 
Though these statistics are eye-popping, they too need to be taken with a 
grain of salt. First, the number of observations is low and with more cases 
being adjudicated, the results may become more balanced. Second, out of the 
twenty-one adjudicated cases, seven involved a single family of patents held 
by a single patentee, which in large part rose and fell together.351  
Nonetheless, the extraordinarily high rate of invalidation in the CBMR 
proceedings is a cause for concern. It is especially so when the PTAB’s judg-
ment is directly contrary to that of federal courts even on what has long been 
considered a pure question of law. For example, at least one patent that was 
invalidated in the CBMR proceedings not only was upheld at trial, but had 
                                                                                                                           
 346 Id. at 1, 2. 
 347 Id. at 2. 
 348 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 78 
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CBM2013-00033, Paper No. 45 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2014) (Final Written Decision). 
 349 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 78 
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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper No. 66 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 
23, 2014). All these cases concerned patents owed by Progressive Insurance Company and all 
were brought by Liberty Mut. Insurance Company. 
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those findings affirmed by the Federal Circuit.352 The accused infringer did 
not even appeal the validity findings to the Federal Circuit. Instead, the in-
fringer filed a request for CBMR and, utilizing the lower burden of proof, had 
the claims invalidated.353 Applying a different claim construction than that 
which was used by federal courts, the PTAB invalidated the patent.354 
In another case, CBMR was instituted after a patent was found to be val-
id by the District Court.355 Even though the District Court found the patent to 
be not infringed (albeit valid), the accused infringer chose to insure himself 
against Federal Circuit reversal on the issue of infringement by turning to the 
PTAB to invalidate the patent found to be valid at trial.356 After a hearing, the 
PTAB invalidated the patent.357 
Though the data are obviously very preliminary and not yet sufficiently 
voluminous to draw any definitive conclusions, it does appear that the CBMR 
process can be and is used to avoid federal judgment against infringers. This 
creates uncertainty not only in the patent rights themselves, but also in the 
right to a duly entered judgment. 
In summary, the AIA post-issuance review processes thus far seem to be 
a boon for the patent challengers with almost no countervailing benefits to the 
patentees. But, from the patentee’s perspective, drawbacks are not limited to 
the high claim invalidation rate at the PTAB. Rather, there are significant ex-
tra costs that flow from the third parties’ ability to use the threat of invoking 
these processes against the patentees’ property rights. These costs become 
evident when one considers the several case studies below. 
V. THE ABUSES IN THE SYSTEM 
As previously discussed, the ex parte reexamination system, as well as 
the new AIA post-issuance review proceedings are rife with opportunities for 
abuse against the patentees. Though Congress apparently attempted to fix the 
problems with the ex parte reexamination, a number of opportunities for 
                                                                                                                           
 352 See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (af-
firming the district court’s judgment of infringement and validity). 
 353 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., CBM2012-00001, Paper No. 70, at 2–3 
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abuse not only persisted, but actually increased with the passage of the Amer-
ica Invents Act.  
Although the statistics in the preceding Part tell some of the story, this 
Part will focus on specific examples of the abuses that occur under the cover 
of the AIA umbrella. Section A discusses rent seeking behavior,358 while Sec-
tion B addresses attempts to evade estoppel and time bars.359 Then, Section C 
examines seriatim attempts at invalidation.360 Finally, Section D surveys the 
use of post-issuance review proceedings to retaliate against other firms or 
create pressure to force settlements.361 
A. Rent Seeking 
The threat of instituting post-issuance review proceedings can be part of 
rent-seeking behavior on the part of firms or individuals not even involved in 
an underlying patent dispute. A clear example of such behavior is the case of 
four patents owned by VirnetX, Inc. The patents in question cover a method 
for transparently creating a virtual private network between a client computer 
and a target computer and creating a secure domain name service.362 In 2010, 
VirnetX filed suit against Apple, Inc. alleging infringement of these patents. 
Apple defended on the grounds that the patents are invalid. At trial, VirnetX 
prevailed on every issue and received a jury award of $368,160,000.363 A 
judgment was entered on the verdict,364 and Apple took an appeal to the Fed-
eral Circuit.365 While an appeal was pending, a hitherto unknown entity, New 
Bay Capital, LLC filed an IPR request against each of the patents owned and 
asserted by VirnetX.366 Prior to filing the requests, however, New Bay made 
an offer to VirnetX. For 10% of the jury verdict (or almost $37 million), it 
was willing to forego the filing of the IPR request. 
                                                                                                                           
 358 See infra notes 362–371 and accompanying text. 
 359 See infra notes 372–396 and accompanying text. 
 360 See infra notes 397–428 and accompanying text. 
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IPR2013-00376, Paper No. 5 (P.T.A.B. June 23, 2014) (Petition for Review); New Bay Capital, 
LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00375, Paper No. 4 (P.T.A.B. June 23, 2014) (Petition for Re-
view). 
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Neither New Bay, nor its parent company was ever involved in any liti-
gation with VirnetX, nor was it ever threatened with any patent enforcement 
action. Indeed, it is unclear what, if anything, New Bay does. Yet, because of 
a lack of any standing requirements to file an IPR request, New Bay was able 
to engage the machinery of the PTO in its quest to obtain thirty-seven million 
dollars for doing absolutely nothing of note. The ability to request IPR was a 
powerful tool in New Bay’s arsenal.  
Although VirnetX refused New Bay’s demand for a pay-off, it paid a 
high price when New Bay carried through on its threat. Within a week of the 
IPRs being filed, VirnetX’s stock price fell by 25%, which translated into a 
250 million dollar loss in market capitalization.367 This price volatility may 
well have been the reason for New Bay’s requests, as one of the possible rea-
sons for its actions is their market position with respect to VirnetX’s stock.368 
Whatever the reason for New Bay’s payoff demand and subsequent IPR 
request, it illustrates that the system can be used to destroy not just the value 
of a patent, but the value of a patentee’s entire enterprise. And that multi-
million dollar damage can be accomplished at the relatively low cost of an 
IPR filing.369 Because the cost of filing an IPR request to the patent challeng-
er is fairly modest, the threat of going through with it is almost always credi-
ble. Given the possible high costs imposed on the patentee, the patentee is in 
a lose-lose situation: either submit to a challenger’s monetary (or other) de-
mands, or risk suffering losses on the market. The challenger, on the other 
hand, is in a win-win situation. It need not even prosecute its challenge to 
completion. In fact, New Bay abandoned its challenge before the PTAB even 
decided whether to institute an IPR in response to New Bay’s request.370 De-
                                                                                                                           
 367 See Michelle Carniaux & Michael E. Sander, The Curious Case of New Bay Capital LLC 
and VirnetX Inc., IPR BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://interpartesreviewblog.com/curious-case-new-
bay-capital-llc-virnetx-inc/, archived at http://perma.cc/FV4E-KUUR. 
 368 See Tom Shaughnessy, VirnetX: New Bay Capital LLC’s And Apple’s Contrived IPRs - 
Part 2: New Bay Retraces, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/
article/1772542-virnetx-new-bay-capital-llcs-and-apples-contrived-iprs-part-2-new-bay-retraces, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BV8A-C5BJ. 
 369 The American Intellectual Property Law Association estimates that the “all-in” cost for an IPR 
is somewhere around $300,000. See TOM ENGELLENNER, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS’N, COM-
PARISON OF FEDERAL COURT, ITC, AND USPTO PROCEEDINGS IN IP DISPUTES 21, 22 (Jan. 2014), 
available at http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-Japan/Committee%20
Documents/2014%20MWI%20Presentations/Tom%20Engellenner%20-%20IP%20Dispute%20Cost
%20Comparison.ppt, archived at https://perma.cc/3H8Z-B4GC?type=pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
The amount of money that could be made in the market however, can far exceed the cost of an 
IPR. 
 370 See New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00378, Paper No. 14, at 1 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Proceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2013-00377, Paper No. 14, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Pro-
ceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00376, Paper No. 17, at 1 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Proceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., 
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spite this early abandonment of its challenge, New Bay managed to wreak 
havoc on VirnetX’s market position (and possibly managed to make a signifi-
cant profit from VirnetX’s losses). In other words, the entire proceedings were 
nothing but a naked wealth transfer from the patentee to an entity that seem-
ingly exists solely for attempts to collect money from the patentee.  
Such machinations defeat all possible purposes of having the post-
issuance review proceedings in the first place. An abandoned challenge does 
not result in cancellation of patents’ of “dubious validity” (assuming arguen-
do that VirnetX’s patents would fit into that category), thus ill-serving the 
public interest in clearing the field from invalid patents. Nor does such a chal-
lenge make the patentee more secure in his rights as the challenge never gets 
formally adjudicated by the PTAB, leaving the patentee (and the public) 
wondering whether the art cited against the patent is truly invalidating, and if 
so, whether to expect new challenges based on the same art.371 Given that 
nothing was resolved in the process, it is impossible to talk about increased 
speed or decreased cost for dispute resolution. In short, the result of the New 
Bay petitions was diametrically opposed to the announced goals of the post-
issuance proceedings that New Bay relied on. 
The setup of the AIA post-issuance proceedings almost ensures that 
more “New Bays” will come about. The opportunity to make money by 
shorting the market or by extracting rents from the patentee is simply too 
great to pass up. And because it is the most valuable patents that are the pre-
ferred targets of such requests, it is the value of the truly innovative compa-
nies that is likely to be destroyed (or at least significantly damaged) by this 
rent-seeking usage of the post-issuance proceedings. Such use of the proceed-
ings will result in wealth transfers from innovators and investors in technolo-
gy to investors in litigation, thus spurring rather than diminishing patent dis-
putes and litigation. 
                                                                                                                           
IPR2013-00375, Paper No. 16, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Pro-
ceeding). 
 371 Admittedly, when New Bay abandoned its challenge, the PTAB treated the motion to 
abandon as a request for adverse judgment that triggered estoppel provisions against New Bay. 
See New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00378, Paper No. 14, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 
12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Proceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2013-00377, Paper No. 14, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Pro-
ceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00376, Paper No. 17, at 1 (P.T.A.B. 
Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the Proceeding); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, 
Inc., IPR2013-00375, Paper No. 16, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2013) (Judgment: Termination of the 
Proceeding). Nonetheless, the judgments against New Bay do not preclude any other party from 
using the same materials to request an IPR against VirnetX. That is especially true given that the 
Board had not decided whether to institute an IPR on the basis of New Bay’s filings, thus giving 
no hint as to its view of the strength of New Bay’s evidence or argument. 
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B. Evasion of Estoppel and Time Bars 
The AIA attempted to rein in seriatim requests for post-issuance review 
by patent challengers by requiring that any request be brought within one year 
of the challenger being sued for infringement and by forbidding re-litigation 
of issues that were or could have been raised in the first PTO proceeding that 
resulted in a final judgment.372 In the minds of the AIA’s drafters, these limi-
tations would protect patentees against harassment by patent challengers.373 
As it turned out, however, these bars can be evaded with relative ease.  
The most prominent example of attempts to evade such strictures also 
stems from the VirnetX patents. While New Bay’s IPR petitions were pend-
ing, Apple—the losing party in district court litigation—filed its own IPR 
petitions.374 As it happens, however, Apple’s petition was not timely because 
VirnetX sued Apple more than one year prior to Apple’s filing of the IPR re-
quest.375 Though Apple attempted to file the request anyway, the PTAB dis-
missed it.376 That should have been the end of the story, but it was not. 
                                                                                                                           
 372 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (creating estoppel provisions); id. § 325(e) (same); see also 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 284, 330 
(2011) (same). 
 373 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 
78; 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 374 Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00398, Paper No. 4 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2013)( Petition 
for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00397, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 2013) 
(Petition for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00394, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. July 1, 
2013) (Petition for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00393, Paper No. 4 (P.T.A.B. 
July 1, 2013) (Petition for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 5 
(P.T.A.B. June 17, 2013) (Petition for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00349, Paper 
No. 1 (P.T.A.B. June 12, 2013) (Petition for Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00348, 
Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. June 12, 2013) (Petition for Review). Three of these requests were filed just 
before New Bay filed its requests and four were filed afterwards. 
 375 See Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00398, Paper No. 16 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) 
(Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00394, Paper No. 15 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., 
IPR2013-00393, Paper No. 17 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); 
Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00349, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Deny-
ing Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 20 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00348, 
Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review). 
 376 See Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00398, Paper No. 16 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) 
(Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00394, Paper No. 15 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., 
IPR2013-00393, Paper No. 17 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); 
Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00349, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Deny-
ing Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 20 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00348, 
Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review). Apple’s filing was 
not as frivolous as it might seem. Under the statute, a petition that is otherwise out of time may still 
be filed and joined to a timely filed petition. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). For that reason, Apple attempted to 
have its petition joined to those of the then-pending New Bay petitions. Indeed, Apple opposed the 
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As soon as New Bay’s IPR petitions were withdrawn, seven additional 
IPR requests were filed by RPX Corporation.377 RPX is neither a manufactur-
er nor an inventor of any products. Rather, it “is the leading provider of patent 
risk solutions, offering defensive buying, acquisition syndication, patent intel-
ligence, insurance services, and advisory services.”378 It is a membership-
based organization that provides the aforementioned services to its mem-
bers.379 One of the services it provides is participation in post-issuance review 
in an attempt to invalidate patents.380 Although such attempts are clearly 
meant to benefit RPX’s member-clients, ostensibly, RPX files petitions in its 
own name.381 By using this approach RPX attempted to evade the time bars 
applicable to one of its clients—Apple. 
In its petition for IPR of VirnetX’s patents, RPX asserted that it is the re-
al party in interest and is therefore not bound by any time bars or estoppel 
                                                                                                                           
termination of the proceedings in the New Bay case precisely because it wished to join its out of time 
petitions to the timely filed New Bay petitions. See New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2013-00378 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2013) (Order: Conduct of the Proceeding) (authorizing New Bay 
to file a motion to terminate and denying Apple’s request to file an opposition to the motion to termi-
nate); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00377, Paper No. 13, at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 
1, 2013) (Order: Conduct of the Proceeding) (same); New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2013-00376, Paper No. 14, at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2013) (Order) (same); New Bay Capital, 
LLC v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2013-00375, Paper No. 13, at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2013) (Order: Con-
duct of the Proceeding) (same). Once New Bay’s petitions were denied, however, Apple’s request for 
joinder was dismissed as moot. See Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00398, Paper No. 16 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., 
IPR2013-00394, Paper No. 15 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); 
Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00393, Paper No. 17 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (Decision: Deny-
ing Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00349, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2013-00354, 
Paper No. 20 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes Review); Apple Inc. v. Vir-
netX Inc., IPR2013-00348, Paper No. 14 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013) (Decision: Denying Inter Partes 
Review).  
 377 See RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) 
(Petition for Review); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00176, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 
20, 2013) (Petition for Review); Petition for Review, RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-
00175, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc, 
IPR2014-00174, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review); RPX Corp. v. Vir-
netX, Inc., IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review); RPX 
Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00172, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Re-
view); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00171, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Peti-
tion for Review). 
 378 See, e.g., RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 2, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 
20, 2013) (Petition for Review); Company, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/about-rpx/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/DG46-UE68?type=source (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 379 See RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 2, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 
2013) (Petition for Review); Why Join, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/why-join-rpx/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/QUZ7-GRFA?type=source (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 380 RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 2, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) 
(Petition for Review). 
 381 Id at 3. 
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provisions that may be applicable against Apple.382 It further asserted that 
though it “has solicited contributions from its clients to help fund” its patent 
challenges, it retains the “sole discretion over and controls the decision of 
which patents to contest through PTO post-issuance proceedings, the grounds 
that are raised in any petition . . . the conduct of RPX in such proceedings and 
the decision to continue or terminate the participation of RPX in any such 
proceeding.”383 
After receiving $500,000 from Apple and engaging the same law firm 
Apple used to defend itself against charges of infringing VirnetX’s patents,384 
RPX decided, in the exercise of this supposedly “sole discretion,” that Vir-
netX’s patents are “of questionable validity,” and should be challenged before 
the PTO. The PTAB eventually held that on the very specific facts of RPX’s 
petition, the real party in interest was Apple, and therefore the time bars ap-
plicable to Apple were equally applicable to RPX.385  
That holding, however, was predicated on a particularly strong inter-
twining of Apple’s work and needs with RPX’s actions. It is not clear from 
the Board’s opinion that the mere fact of Apple’s membership in RPX would 
have been sufficient to bind RPX with Apple’s deadlines.386 In other words, 
there may be opportunities for multiple rounds of reviews initiated not just by 
RPX itself, but by any of its members. Just because RPX’s member-client, 
who paid membership dues, may benefit from RPX’s decision to seek post-
issuance review, it does not lead to the conclusion that such a member-client 
is the true “real party in interest.” This suspicion is bolstered by the fact that 
within a month after the PTAB denied RPX’s petition against VirnetX, RPX 
filed four new petitions against another patentee who also secured a multi-
million patent infringement judgment.387 One would assume that RPX’s at-
                                                                                                                           
 382 Id. at 1, 4. 
 383 Id. at 3. 
 384 See RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, IPR2014-00171, IPR2014-00172, IPR2014-00173, IPR2014-
00174, IPR2014-00175, IPR2014-00176, IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 49, at 8 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 
2014) (Decision: Denial of Inter Partes Review) (issuing a single decision denying IPR for all of 
RPX’s petitions). 
 385 Id. at 10. 
 386 Id. (specifying that the conclusion is reached on that particular record). 
 387 See RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-01107, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. July 2, 2014) 
(Petition for Review); RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-00948, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. 
June 12, 2014); RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-00947, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. June 12, 
2014) (Petition for Review); RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc. IPR2014-00946, Paper No. 1 
(P.T.A.B. June 12, 2014) (Petition for Review). All of these petitions have been filed against Par-
kerVision, Inc., which prevailed in a jury trial against Qualcomm and was awarded $172 million 
in damages. A week after RPX filed its petitions, the district court vacated the jury verdict and 
entered judgment in favor of Qualcomm on the issue of infringement. See ParkerVision, Inc. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1289 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2014). Qualcomm is not a mem-
ber of RPX. See, e.g., RPX Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-00947, Paper No. 1, at 1 n.1 
(P.T.A.B. June 12, 2014) (Petition for Review). But, given the type of products marketed by Qual-
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torneys took the Board’s holding in VirnetX’s case into account when filing 
their new petitions. 
RPX’s actions, however, are not limited to evading estoppel and time 
bars to post-issuance proceedings. They also serve to enable each of their 
members (who happen not to be subject to any bars) to share costs and infor-
mation on the potential lines of attack against a patent. Then that information 
can be deployed piecemeal against a patentee to keep her patent under a con-
stant and continuous IPR threat. In effect, that is what nearly occurred in Vir-
netX’s case. 
Because VirnetX’s patents involve fundamental technology used by 
multiple software companies, Apple was not the only company interested in 
invalidating these patents (nor was it the only company that VirnetX sued).388 
Another industry giant and RPX client—Microsoft—wanted these patents 
eliminated.389 Microsoft filed its own twelve separate petitions over the 
course of three months, challenging six separate patents owned by VirnetX.390 
Four of these patents were previously challenged by RPX,391 and Microsoft’s 
                                                                                                                           
comm and the patented technology, it is likely that other RPX clients would greatly benefit from 
RPX’s success before the PTAB. 
 388 See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-417, 2013 WL 789288 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 1, 2013); VirnetX, Inc. v. Mitel Networks Corp., No. 6:11-CV-18, 2012 WL 3135639 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); VirnetX, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV80, 2009 WL 2370727 (E.D. 
Tex. July 30, 2009). 
 389 See A Steadily Expanding Network of Industry Leaders, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/
rpx-membership/rpx-client-network/, archived at https://perma.cc/QUZ7-GRFA?type=source (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2015) (providing a sampling of RPX’s clients). 
 390 Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00615, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2014) 
(Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,921,211); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00612, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. 
Patent No. 7,418,504); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00616, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. 
Apr. 14, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,921,211); Microsoft Corp. v. 
VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00618, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2014) (Petition for Review) 
(same); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00614, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,418,504); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00613, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2014) (Petition for Review) (same); Microsoft 
Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00610, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014) (Petition for Re-
view) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00558, 
Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 
6,502,135); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00405, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 
2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,188,180); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, 
Inc., IPR2014-00404, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging 
U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00403, Paper No. 2 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2014) (Petition for Review) (same); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-
00401, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 
7,188,180). 
 391 See RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00177, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) 
(Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,418,504); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00176, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review) (same); RPX Corp. 
v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00175, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review) 
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petitions alleged the exact same grounds of invalidity that were alleged by 
RPX.392 This was easy to do because, as a client of RPX, Microsoft had ac-
cess to its legal and factual research. The PTO granted seven of Microsoft’s 
petitions,393 denied three as untimely filed,394denied two on the merits,395 
while seven others remain pending. A company like RPX can pool the re-
sources of its members to compile a dossier on a patent that the members 
wish to invalidate.396 The dossier can be made available to all members who 
can then proceed in piecemeal fashion against a patentee. That is precisely 
what happened to at least some of VirnetX’s patents and it is likely that such a 
system will flourish going forward. 
C. Seriatim Attempts at Invalidation 
In the previous Section, this Article explained that a number of patents 
that are subject to a post-issuance review request often face more than one 
such request. When these requests are filed simultaneously, the burden on the 
patentee is somewhat alleviated because the PTAB tends to consolidate mul-
                                                                                                                           
(challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,921,211); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc, IPR2014-00174, Paper No. 2 
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review) (same); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-
00173, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 
7,490,151); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00172, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) 
(Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135); RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00171, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2013) (Petition for Review) (same). 
 392 Compare supra note 390 and accompanying text (Microsoft’s petitions), with supra note 
391 and accompanying text (RPX’s petitions). 
 393 See Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00404, Paper No. 13 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2014) 
(Decision: Institution of Inter Partes Review); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00403, 
Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2014) (Decision: Institution of Inter Partes Review); Microsoft Corp. 
v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00614, Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) (Decision: Institution of Inter 
Partes Review) (joining Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00613); Microsoft Corp. v. Vir-
netX, Inc., IPR2014-00618, Paper No. 10 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) (Decision: Institution of Inter 
Partes Review) (joining Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00615); Microsoft Corp. v. Vir-
netX, Inc., IPR2014-00610, Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) (Decision: Institution of Inter 
Partes Review). Five of the cases subsequently settled without a final determination by the Board. 
See generally Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00610; Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00613; Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00614; Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., 
IPR2014-00615; Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00618. 
 394 See Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00558, Paper No. 13 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 
2014) (Decision: Denial of Inter Partes Review) (order denying IPR as untimely); Microsoft Corp. 
v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00405, Paper No. 10 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2014) (Decision: Denial of 
Inter Partes Review) (same); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00401, Paper No. 10 
(P.T.A.B. July 23, 2014) (Decision: Denial of Inter Partes Review) (same). 
 395 Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00612, Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) 
(Decision: Denial of Inter Partes Review); Microsoft Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00616, 
Paper No. 9 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2014) (Decision: Denial of Inter Partes Review). 
 396 Indeed, following the first round of challenges by Apple and Microsoft, VirnetX has been 
faced with an additional seventeen IPR requests by these two companies. 
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tiple pending requests into a single adjudicatory proceedings.397 Even in these 
circumstances, the challenger is in a better position than the patentee because 
the challenger can stagger his filings in such a way as to constantly keep the 
patentee’s attorneys busy with drafting responses to the post-issuance review 
petitions.  
The larger problem, however, comes when, having failed in one post-
issuance review proceeding, the challenger is able to trigger yet another one. 
One way to do this is to ask for an ex parte reexamination first, followed by 
the AIA-created procedures. Another method is to seek IPR first, followed by 
CBMR. Such an approach would not be precluded by the estoppel provisions 
because certain lines of attack that are available in CBMR are not available in 
IPR, meaning that it is not an issue that “could have been raised.”398 Yet an-
other way of seriatim litigation is to challenge different claims in separate 
IPR or CBMR proceedings. This too does not trigger any estoppels, because 
the estoppels are applied on a per claim rather than per patent level.399 
One such instance is a patent owned by Zillow, an online real estate da-
tabase that is directed to online valuation of real estate.400 In October 2012, 
Microstrategy, Inc. filed an IPR request with respect to each of the forty 
claims in Zillow’s patent.401 Microstrategy is a company specializing in 
“provid[ing] the most flexible, powerful, scalable and user-friendly [enter-
prise software] platforms for analytics, mobile, identity and loyalty—offered 
either on premises or in the cloud,”402a business that has little apparent con-
nection with real estate. The Board granted the request in part, instituting re-
view with respect to twenty-nine out of the forty claims.403 On March 27, 
2014, the Board cancelled twenty-five of the twenty-nine litigated claims and 
upheld the remaining four.404 Zillow retained nineteen total claims following 
the conclusion of the IPR.  
That should have allowed Zillow to breathe at least a partial sigh of re-
lief. Instead, almost immediately following this partial victory, Zillow was 
haled right back before the PTO by Trulia—a competitor in the online real 
estate valuation market. On April 10, 2014, a mere two weeks after Zillow 
                                                                                                                           
 397 In some of the cases, though the petitions may not be formally joined, the PTAB permits a 
single discovery and oral argument processes. 
 398 See supra notes 278–279, 287 and accompanying text. 
 399 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 400 See U.S. Patent No. 7,970,674 (filed Feb. 3, 2006) (issued June 28, 2011). 
 401 See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034, Paper No. 2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 
2014) (Petition for Review). 
 402 About Us, MICROSTRATEGY, https://www.microstrategy.com/us/about-us/overview, archived 
at https://perma.cc/2LC8-Y56G?type=image (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 403 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034, Paper No. 17, at 26–27 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 
2013) (Decision: Institution of Inter Partes Review) (granting IPR in part and denying in part). 
 404 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR 2013-00034, Paper No. 42, at 42–43 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 27, 2014) (Final Written Decision). 
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managed to retain nineteen out of forty claims of its patent, Trulia filed a 
CBMR petition asking for a review of fifteen of the claims in Zillow’s pa-
tent.405 Interestingly enough, part of the petition went to the claims already 
cancelled in the prior IPR proceedings, but nine of the identified claims were 
ones that the PTAB declined to even institute a trial on in the previous IPR 
proceedings.406 Despite previously prevailing on the issue (albeit against a 
different petitioner), Zillow had to defend its right to the claims at issue all 
over again.407 The PTAB promptly instituted trial on all but one of the chal-
lenged claims.408 Zillow’s patent has been under a consistent cloud since Oc-
tober 2012, i.e., nearly two years as of this writing, and will spend additional 
time in limbo until the Board issues its final decision on Trulia’s CBMR peti-
tions. Of course, these petitions could be followed with more petitions chal-
lenging other remaining claims. In that manner, Zillow’s patent could be kept 
in limbo for significantly longer than it would have taken to resolve district 
court litigation. 
But Zillow is not the only victim of such tactics. Another good example 
is PersonalWeb Technologies. PersonalWeb is an owner of a number of pa-
tents generally directed to properly identifying and recalling data in complex 
data systems.409 In December of 2012, an IPR was requested (and ultimately 
granted) on claims in six of these patents.410 As relevant here, on May 15, 
2014, the PTAB issued a final decision invalidating claims in two of the chal-
                                                                                                                           
 405 See Trulia, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., CBM2014-00115, Paper No. 3 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014) 
(Petition for Review). 
 406 Compare Trulia, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., CBM2014-00115, Paper No. 3 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 
2014) (Petition for Review), with MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034, Paper No. 
17, at 26–27 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2013) (Decision: Institution of Inter Partes Review) (granting IPR 
in part and denying in part). 
 407 Trulia had another CBMR petition already pending before the PTAB. See Trulia, Inc. v. 
Zillow, Inc., CBM2013-00056, Paper No. 13 (P.T.A.B. Mar 10, 2014) (Order: Institution of 
CBMR). When the PTAB granted the new petition, it joined it to the previous one. See Trulia, Inc. 
v. Zillow, Inc., CBM2014-00115, Paper No. 8, at 20 (P.T.A.B. May 1, 2014) (Order: Institution of 
CBMR). 
 408 See id. 
 409 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,001,096 (filed Oct. 31, 2007) (issued Aug. 16, 2011); U.S. 
Patent No. 7,945,544 (filed Oct. 31, 2007) (issued May 17, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 7,945,539 
(filed Oct. 31, 2007) (issued May 17, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 7,949,662 (filed Dec. 23, 2003) (is-
sued May 24, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 6,415,280 (filed Apr. 1, 1999) (issued July 2, 2002); U.S. 
Patent No. 5,978,791 (filed Oct. 24, 1997) (issued Nov. 2, 1999). 
 410 See EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 5 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
17, 2012) (Petition for Review); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00086, Paper 
No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014) (Petition for Review); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, 
IPR2013-00085, Paper No. 5 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014) (Petition for Review); EMC Corp. v. Per-
sonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00084, Paper No. 3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014) (Petition for Re-
view); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00083, Paper No. 6 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 
2012) (Petition for Review); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00082, Paper No. 
6 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2012) (Petition for Review). 
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lenged patents.411 The Board invalidated ten claims (out of a total of forty-
eight) in one patent412 and two (out of a total of fifty-five)413 claims in the 
second patent. The patentee appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit.414 While the appeal was pending, another challenger filed additional IPR 
requests against both patents.415 These new requests challenged the already 
cancelled claims, as well as some claims that were previously not subject to 
an IPR.416 
At the first glance, seeking review of already cancelled claims may seem 
odd, or at least superfluous. Given that claims once held unpatenable cannot 
be asserted against any party,417 it would seem to be a waste of resources to 
attempt to again prove unpatentability. Upon closer inspection though, the 
strategy makes sense. By submitting such arguments, the challenger contin-
ues to keep the challenged claims in limbo even if the Federal Circuit were to 
reverse the Board’s judgment. If that were to happen, the petitioner who was 
not a party to the previous litigation would not be bound by the Federal Cir-
cuit’s decision and would be free to make new and additional arguments re-
garding invalidity of the claims that were confirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals.418 This allows the challengers to keep any claim under a cloud of un-
certainty for a potentially indefinite period.419 
                                                                                                                           
 411 See EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00083, Paper No. 80 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00082, 
Paper No. 83 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision). The Board also invalidated claims 
in the other four patents, but they are not relevant for the present discussion. See generally EMC 
Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 69 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2015) (Final 
Written Decision); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00086, Paper No. 66 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, 
IPR2013-00085, Paper No. 73 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision); EMC Corp. v. 
PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00084, Paper No. 64 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written 
Decision). 
 412 EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00082, Paper No. 83, at 66 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision). 
 413 EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00083, Paper No. 80, at 42 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 5, 2015) (Final Written Decision). 
 414 See EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00082, Paper No. 84, (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 20, 2015) (Patent Owner’s Notice of Appeal); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, 
IPR2013-00083, Paper No. 81, (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2015) (Patent Owner’s Notice of Appeal) 
 415 See Google, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2014-00980, Paper No. 1 (P.TA.B. June 
18, 2014) (Petition for Review); Google, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2014-00977, Paper 
No. 1 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (Petition for Review). 
 416 Compare Google, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2014-00980, and Google, Inc. v. 
PersonalWeb Tech., LLC, IPR2014-00977, with supra notes 412–413 and accompanying text 
(EMC Corporation’s IPR challenges to the ’791 and ’280 patents). 
 417 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–50 (1971). 
 418 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (stating that non-parties are generally not 
bound by judgments of the federal courts). 
 419 For another example of problems created by uncertainty in the intellectual property con-
text, see Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 383 (2009) (“This period 
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In addition to the “insurance” arguments, the new IPR requester chal-
lenged claims not previously subject to an IPR.420 What is interesting is that 
the “new” claims421 were challenged on the same grounds as were the claims 
in the preceding IPR, i.e., the same prior art that was used to argue that the 
first set of claims were invalid was used to argue that the new claims are inva-
lid.422 Although there is nothing wrong with using arguments made in one 
case (especially a successful one) to bolster a different case, what such 
“stacking” of IPR petitions allows challengers to do is to make sure that a 
patent never gets out from under an IPR review. By challenging only one or a 
few claims at a time the challengers are able to preclude, or at least severely 
inhibit, a patentee’s ability to monetize or even enforce her patent.  
Although a patent that is in the midst of an IPR proceeding continues to 
be enforceable,423 judges may stay the infringement action while the IPR is 
ongoing.424 That is exactly what happened to PersonalWeb’s infringement 
actions.425 While the PTO review and any appeals therefrom are ongoing, 
patentees may be de facto barred from actually enforcing their patents to the 
fullest. If they ultimately prevail in the PTO, patentees can obtain damages 
for any infringing activities that occurred during the review process.426 But, 
that may be insufficient to compensate a patent owner.427 And the longer 
                                                                                                                           
is one of uncertainty for a trademark applicant. He can choose to launch his product or service 
with an unregistered mark, but doing so could mean losing any investments in advertising and 
marketing associated with a potential registration refusal and a subsequent change in marks.”). 
 420 See supra note 415 and accompanying text. 
 421 The claims are not new in a sense that they were recently added, but in a sense that they 
are new to the IPR proceedings. Both sets of claims were part of the same patent and issued at the 
same time. 
 422 See supra note 416 and accompanying text. 
 423 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428–29 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 424 See Yasser El-Gamal et al., The New Battlefield: One Year of Inter Partes Review Under 
the America Invents Act, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 39, 55 (2014) (tabulating district courts’ receptiveness to 
motions to stay in light of a parallel IPR proceeding). 
 425 See PersonalWeb Tech., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-EJD, 2014 WL 
116340, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (granting motion to stay pending IPR review). 
 426 See Janis, supra note 54, at 67 (noting that recovery of damages for past infringement is 
precluded only if the claim was modified during reexamination); Mercado, supra note 133, at 574 
(indicating that, according to the PTO Commissioner, “patentees may continue to enforce their 
patents” during a reexamination proceeding). 
 427 Cf. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (recognizing that dam-
ages may not always be an adequate remedy for patent infringement). The courts may not be able 
to enjoin ongoing infringement even after the patentee has prevailed at trial so long as the patent is 
in some sort of post-issuance proceedings. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 
Inc., 996 F.2d 1236, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that injunction should be stayed 
pending completion of reexamination). But see MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 591 (E.D. Va. 2007) (holding that absent the final PTO decision on reexamination a 
stay of permanent injunction is inappropriate). 
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owners have to wait, the less adequate the eventual monetary compensation is 
likely to be.428 
The challengers therefore have every incentive to “stack” their IPR and 
CBMR petitions to deprive the patent owner of his ability to fully and con-
sistently enforce his patents. Given the structure of the IPR review process, 
there is little to nothing that the patentee can do to prevent such abuse. 
D. Retaliation and Pressure Tool 
The post-issuance review proceedings are also not used to accomplish 
the stated goal of the America Invents Act (and the preceding legislation) to 
rid the world of “low quality” patents. Instead they are used to either settle 
scores with patent owners or to strong-arm companies into more favorable 
licensing deals. The Zillow patent discussed in the preceding Section is an 
example of such “score-settling.” 
Recall that the first challenger to the Zillow patent was a company with 
no relationship to Zillow or the technology protected by the patents.429 Nor 
was the challenger an RPX-like company that has patent invalidation as one 
of its stated goals.430 It is somewhat puzzling as to why a company whose 
business is the provision of enterprise software platforms would be willing to 
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars litigating a patent which would never 
threaten them or their clients. As a legal matter, Microstrategy was perfectly 
within its rights to seek an IPR of Zillow’s patent, for there is no standing 
requirement to initiate such a procedure.431 But as an economic matter, the 
decision seems illogical. Zillow’s responsive pleading, however, resolves this 
mystery.432 
As it turns out, Microstrategy was involved in another, entirely unrelated 
patent litigation against an unrelated third party on an unrelated patent.433 The 
only thing that connected that litigation to Zillow, was the fact that Zillow’s 
attorneys (the large law firm of Susman Godfrey) also happened to represent 
Microstrategy’s opponents—Vasudevan Software, Inc., also known as VSi.434 
During the course of negotiations between VSi and Microstrategy, Mi-
crostrategy threatened that unless the infringement lawsuit against them was 
                                                                                                                           
 428 In the meantime, the owner may lose market share and name recognition. 
 429 See supra note 402 and accompanying text. 
 430 See supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
 431 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012). 
 432 See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034, Paper No. 16, at 4–5 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 15, 2013) (Patent Owner Preliminary Response). 
 433 See Order Denying Motion for Sanctions, Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Microstrategy, Inc., 
No. 3:11-CV-06637-RS, at 2–4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013), Doc. 172. Microstrategy “essentially 
conced[ed] that it has “no legitimate business interest in the validity of the Zillow patent.” Id. at 4. 
 434 Id. at 2. 
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dropped, not only would they seek PTO review of all of VSi’s patents, but 
that they would retaliate against Susman Godfrey by going after their cli-
ents.435 When VSi’s lawsuit was not dropped, Microstrategy followed 
through on its threat and filed a petition for IPR against Zillow.436 The peti-
tion ultimately resulted in the invalidation of twenty-five out of forty claims 
in Zillow’s patent.437 It may well be that these claims should never have is-
sued and that the public is ultimately better off with them being cancelled. 
Microstrategy’s IPR request, however, exemplifies how the system can be 
used for improper purposes and as a tool to browbeat patent owners, even 
ones who have nothing whatsoever to do with whatever has raised the ire of 
the petitioner. 
The case also illustrates how the post-issuance review system can be 
used to extract better settlement terms from patent owners. When Microstrat-
egy was unable to get VSi to drop its lawsuit, it petitioned the PTO for an IPR 
of all four of VSi’s patents.438 Two of the four patents for which a reexamina-
tion was requested had already been reexamined once before and four of the 
seven references cited as invalidating prior art had already been considered 
by the PTO in the prior proceedings.439 Microstrategy did not even try to hide 
that its purpose in seeking reexamination was to increase costs on VSi and to 
cow it into dropping the suit against Microstrategy.440 It was not about at-
tempting, in good faith, to prove that any of the claims at issue were invalid 
because of anticipation or obviousness.441 Rather, it was an attempt to extract 
a more favorable settlement agreement (in this case a complete dismissal of 
litigation). 
Another egregious example of abusing the post-issuance review process 
is the case of ImmunoGen, a company that is working “to develop innovative 
                                                                                                                           
 435 Id. 
 436 Id. 
 437 See supra note 403 and accompanying text. 
 438 See Order Denying Motion for Sanctions, Vasudevan Software, No. 3:11-CV-06637-RS, at 
2. The filing occurred on September 14, 2012, a mere two days before the inter parties reexamina-
tion was abolished and replaced by IPR. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 439 See Order Denying Motion for Sanctions, Vasudevan Software, No. 3:11-CV-06637-RS, at 
2. Despite that, the PTO, consistent with its near-automatic granting of reexamination petitions, 
ordered VSi’s patents into reexamination. 
 440 See id. at 2–4 (describing the facts as “largely undisputed”). 
 441 Microstrategy ultimately managed to convince the district court that the patents were inva-
lid for indefiniteness. Order Granting Summary Judgment of Invalidity, Vasudevan Software, 
3:11-CV-06637-RS, at 20 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013). But, indefiniteness is not one of the grounds 
that can be considered in reexamination (or IPR). 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). In light of the fact 
that Microstrategy did not appear to make any section 102 or section 103-based arguments in the 
district court but instead relied exclusively on indefiniteness, it would seem that the reexamination 
request was filed for no reason other than to browbeat the plaintiff by increasing its costs into 
terminating its suit. 
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anticancer therapies that meaningfully improve the lives of patients.”442 Sev-
eral patents on certain antibodies that are useful in cancer therapies resulted 
from ImmunoGen’s work and were eventually licensed to Genentech (a large 
biotechnology company), which in turn practiced the patents.443 The relation-
ship between ImmunoGen and its licensee was quite productive.444 
At some point, Genentech was sued by another company, Phigenix, 
Inc.,445 which holds a patent on the method of treating a certain type of breast 
cancer.446 In its suit Phigenix claimed that the sale and use of the drug mar-
keted by Genentech (and covered by ImmunoGen’s patent) infringes its 
method patents.447 In addition to suing Genentech, however, Phigenix also 
filed an IPR request against ImmunoGen’s patents.448 ImmonoGen does not 
appear to have ever asserted its patents against Phigenix (in part because Phi-
genix does not manufacture any pharmaceutical products), and therefore the 
invalidation of ImmunoGen’s patents in and of itself would bring Phigenix no 
tangible benefit. Yet, Phigenix was willing to spend thousands of dollars 
fighting irrelevant (from its perspective) patents. The only reason for this fil-
ing appears to be obtaining more favorable licensing terms in an unrelated 
negotiation with the patentee’s partner, by threatening the valuable assets of 
the patentee.  
Again, the post-issuance review system was being used not to achieve 
any of its goals, but rather as a tool to increase leverage for negotiation. In 
other words, rather than reduce the total litigation expenses, the system actu-
ally increases them, because it allows companies like ImmunoGen to be 
dragged into litigation by companies like Phigenix who have no actual com-
plaint against them (and would be unable to file a civil suit in an Article III 
court).449  
                                                                                                                           
 442 Mission, IMMUNOGEN, INC., http://www.immunogen.com/mission-and-vision, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WD63-HUWV (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 443 See U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856 (filed Dec. 3, 2007) (issued Dec. 25, 2012); U.S. Patent No. 
7,575,748 (filed July 17, 2006) (issued Aug. 18, 2009). 
 444 See Kadcyla, IMMUNOGEN, INC., (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.immunogen.com/kadcyla, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3BZQ-YJU4 (describing the anti-cancer product that is the result of Genen-
tech’s and ImmunoGen’s joint efforts). 
 445 See Complaint, Phigenix, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00287-RWS, at 5–9 (N.D. 
Ga. Jan. 31, 2014). 
 446 See U.S. Patent No. 8,080,534 (filed Feb. 18, 2010) (issued Dec. 20, 2011). 
 447 See Complaint, Phigenix, No. 1:14-cv-00287-RWS, at 5–9. 
 448 See Phigenix Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., IPR2014-00842, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 
2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,575,748); Phigenix Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., IPR2014-00676, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 2014) (Petition for Review) (challenging 
U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856). 
 449 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (stating that “a person who is not the owner of a pa-
tent may file with the [PTO] a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent”), with 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007) (laying out the standing re-
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There is also an additional cost to the public from such filings. Instead of 
spending its time, money, and other resources on developing “innovative, 
effective anticancer therapies that meaningfully improve the lives of patients 
with cancer,” ImmunoGen is now forced to spend it on defending its patent 
before the PTAB. It would be one thing if such costs were offset by the possi-
bility that the invalidation of the patent would lead the challenger to enter the 
market with a competing, more affordable product. But, in this case, that is 
not the reality. Phigenix is not ImmunoGen’s competitor and will not enter 
the market with an alternative to ImmunoGen’s patented antibodies. Society 
is left with an innovative company that, win or lose at the PTO, will have less 
money to dedicate to further research and development of cancer treatment. It 
is hard to fathom that that is what was intended by the patent reformers. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the efforts to reform the 
patent system to decrease or eliminate “dubious patents” and “reduce litiga-
tion costs” have almost uniformly failed to take into account the costs such 
reforms impose on patentees. It argues that although the benefits of various 
patent reform measures may be quite real, they should be weighed against the 
true costs of those reforms. The data and the case studies presented in this 
Article show that the current system of post-issuance review can be, and is, 
abused. Such abuses not only impose costs that Congress failed to fully con-
sider in enacting the legislation, but also result in outcomes directly contrary 
to the goals Congress thought it would accomplish.450  
Congress is perpetually interested in patent reform, partially because 
each attempt at reform fails to fully take into account the experience of prior 
reforms and to consider the full scale of costs associated with the proposals. 
For that reason, the reform attempts nearly always come up short, perpetuat-
ing further calls for reform. That is not to say that every change in the patent 
laws since the founding of the Republic has been ill-conceived. Rather this 
Article attempts to show that: 
There will [always] be cases, in spite of any changes we make in 
the law, where practitioners at the Patent Office will impose upon 
the office and induce it to grant patents ought not to be granted, 
where attorneys will get out patents that are worthless, which they 
know are anticipated, and betray their client for the sake of winning 
a fee from him, although they know that when such a patent is ob-
                                                                                                                           
quirements for bringing a declaratory judgment invalidity action). The upshot is that the IPR sys-
tem encourages proliferation of disputes and therefore costs, rather than reduction in either. 
 450 It is likely that these abuses would only get worse as the PGR proceedings become availa-
ble. 
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tained it will be mere waste paper in his hands, or only useful to de-
fraud the public.451 
Creating additional and ever-more expansive procedures to eradicate 
such patents is a dubious approach because it may end up imposing unneces-
sary and exceedingly high costs on legitimate patents and patentees. It is a 
lesson that Congress would be well-advised to heed as it proceeds to debate 
yet another round of patent reform. 
                                                                                                                           
 451 ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS, H.R. MIS. DOC. 50, at 135 (2d Sess. 1878) 
(argument of J.J. Storrow). 
